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ABSTRACT 
 
The Poujadist Movement, which began as a protest of shopkeepers in southern France in 1953 
and rose to national prominence in the elections of January, 1956, was, at the time of its political 
activity, accused by its critics of fascism. While analyses of the Poujadists have generally 
focused on the movement’s ideological characteristics to evaluate its possible fascism or its 
classification as a member of the French far right, I look at Pierre Poujade and the label of 
fascism in the context of the postwar political climate and the politicized memory of the French 
Resistance. In addition to analyzing charges of fascism originating on the left of the political 
spectrum, among the members of the French Communist Party, I evaluate similar accusations 
voiced by members of the Gaullist right. Noting that the myth of the Resistance served as a 
source of postwar legitimacy among both the followers of Charles de Gaulle and the 
Communists, I argue that, by accusing the Poujadists of fascism, the two extremes of the Fourth 
Republic’s parliament were seeking to tap into the anti-fascist narratives that informed their 
political lineages in order to attempt to regain governmental participation. 
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FASCISM 
 
Roger Griffin, perhaps the best-known representative of the intellectual community of post-Cold 
War theorists of fascism, writes in the opening article of the first issue of Fascism that academic 
studies of fascism enjoy today “a prolonged spring after a winter of hard times.” Prior to the 
emergence of scholars such as himself, Griffin argues, “academics babbled about fascism as ‘full 
of contradictions’ or having ‘the form of an ideology without the content’ instead of actually 
bothering to engage with the fascists’ own understanding of their political goals and historical 
mission.”1 In the 1990s there emerged a consensus, albeit a largely self-proclaimed one, in the 
study of fascism among non-Marxist liberal academics. Though the authors who represent this 
consensus have differing views as to what the ideological components of fascism are, they all 
agree with the premise that there exists a generic form of fascism, that is, one not confined 
temporally and spatially to Mussolini’s Italy; and, most importantly, there is a level of agreement 
that fascism did and does indeed have a discernable underlying ideology.
2
 Additionally notable 
of the contemporary school of fascism studies is the ubiquity of its classification of Nazism 
within the ranks of fascist movements, a consideration that constitutes a rejection of the 
assertions of historians such as Gilbert Allardyce who opposed both the notion of generic 
fascism and the grouping of the two regimes in one category.
3
 
 According to Griffin, central to fascism is the drive for national rebirth, or “palingenesis,” 
that follows a period of supposed decline or destruction; because it serves as a narrative that 
underlies a belief system, palingenesis becomes the “palingenetic myth.” Griffin’s use of the 
                                                          
1
 Roger Griffin, “Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age. From New Consensus to New Wave?,” Fascism: Journal 
of Comparative Fascist Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2012), pp. 1-17 
2
 Roger Eatwell, “On Defining the 'Fascist Minimum’: the Centrality of Ideology,” Journal of Political Ideologies,  
Vol. 1 Issue 3, (October, 1996) pp. 303-20.  
3
 Gilbert Allardyce, “What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept,” The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Apr., 1979), pp. 369-71 
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Greek-derived term in lieu of “rebirth” originates in the author’s wish to highlight the ideology’s 
reliance on the idea of crisis as “palingenesis” finds uses, albeit infrequent, in discussions such as 
the belief in Christ’s second coming which, depending on the interpretation of- and emphasis 
placed on the Book of Revelation is to follow a series of calamities. The author also de-
emphasizes the regenerative nature of “rebirth” in order to stress that, unlike traditional 
conservatism or reactionism which both may embrace nationalism, fascism is inherently 
forward-looking and revolutionary and hence not restorationist. Furthermore, Griffin’s 
conception of fascism is characterized by “populist ultra-nationalism” where “populist” is meant 
not to signify an affiliation with the agrarianism of the late 19
th
 century but rather to suggest that 
fascist movements draw their political legitimacy from the highly ambiguous people. Populism 
and the desire to create a national community, however, do not imply any substantive level of 
rule by consensus as self-appointed vanguards which interpret the needs of the people and of the 
nation are necessarily in control of fascist movements. Fascism is thus paradoxically “populist in 
intent and rhetoric, yet elitist in practice.”4  
Stanley Payne’s work on the definition of fascism anticipated many assertions of the 
1990s academics despite dating back to the 1970s and 80s. The conception of fascism articulated 
by Payne was composed of three separate necessary components: i) fascism’s unique style or 
praxis which encompassed violence and wide use of symbolism, ii) the various targets of its 
animosity such as liberalism, socialism, and conservatism, and iii), most importantly from the 
perspective of 90s scholars, fascism’s ideological affirmations consist of such components as 
                                                          
4
 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, (Routledge: New York, 1993), pp. 26-57 
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nationalism and a commendation of international conflict.
5
 In terms similar to Griffin’s 
definition, Payne’s 1995 History of Fascism describes fascism in a single sentence as  
a form of revolutionary ultranationalism for national rebirth that is based on a primarily 
vitalist philosophy, is structured on extreme elitism, mass mobilization and the 
Führerprinzip, positively values violence as end as well as means and tends to normatize 
war and/or the military virtues.
6
 
As is the case with most theories described here, Payne’s is not without critics. Roger Eatwell 
maintains that Payne defines fascism in terms too specific to the interwar period as, for instance, 
emphases on empire and imperialism were largely absent from the discourse of post-1945 
fascists. Similarly, the negations central to Payne’s approach, argues Eatwell, varied in 
vehemence across not only time, but also between the fascist movements of Europe in the 1920s 
and 30s.
7
 In addition to proposing his own definition which stresses the differences between 
fascism and conservatism as well as its Third Way hostility to capitalism and socialism, Eatwell 
points out the shortcomings of Griffin’s proposed definition, arguing that its emphasis on a myth 
not only confuses propaganda for ideology but also downplays the rational considerations of 
fascist ideology.
8
 
 A further contentious component of Griffin’s thesis is its assertion that elements of 
fascism specific to the interwar period must be treated as nonessential and should therefore be 
distinguished from broader underlying traits useful in the formulation of an all-encompassing 
definition. Kevin Passmore rejects this argument and contends that the specific form of 
nationalism embraced by fascists (i.e. nationalism that is both illiberal and non-conservative) is a 
direct product of the social conditions and political climate of Europe in the two decades that 
                                                          
5
 Stanley Payne, Fascism: Comparison and Definition, (University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, 1980) and Stanley 
Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914–1945, (UCL Press: London1995), p. 3-19  
6
 Payne, A History of Fascism, p. 14 
7
 Eatwell, “’On Defining the ‘Fascist Minimum,’” pp. 307-8 
8
 Ibid. pp. 310 
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followed the Great War.
9
 The central assertion of Passmore’s definition is that fascism seeks to 
subjugate all social and economic considerations to the nation’s perceived needs. This form of 
nationalism is therefore irreversibly opposed to socialism (and to all Marxism-inspired political 
leanings) and to feminism because these worldviews hold the interests of socioeconomic class 
and gender as overriding those of the national community. Not only is fascism opposed to such 
beliefs, but it is also determined to suppress them through the creation of a new political order 
that is often militaristic and characterized by a strong elite class. Because of the above 
considerations derived from its nationalism, fascism is a movement of the extreme right and of 
the radical right.
10
 Passmore and Griffin agree that political racism which at times—but certainly 
not necessarily—took on the form of anti-Semitism is a characteristic trait of fascist movements.  
Unlike Griffin, however, Passmore tends to value history over theory, meaning that, for example, 
he is uneasy with the exclusion from definitions of generic fascism the component of 
paramilitarism, as he contends that a definition without it would render impossible the 
differentiation of interwar fascism from other far-right movements of its time.
11
 
 However internally contentious, the 1990s consensus is essentially unified in its 
opposition to debates of previous decades which would often revolve around questions of the 
political current’s perceived modernity or anti-modernity. In a book that was a groundbreaking 
work in the study of fascism, 1963’s Fascism in Its Epochs/Three Faces of Fascism, Ernst Nolte 
gathers anti-liberalism, anti-individualism and other fascist negations under the umbrella of 
“anti-modernism” which, he argues, characterized not only Italian Fascism, but also German 
National Socialism, and the French Action française. Anti-modernism thus serves as a 
commonality between what today would be considered proto-fascism and the fascist states of 
                                                          
9
 Kevin Passmore, Fascism: a Very Short Introduction, (Oxford University Press: New York, 2002), pp. 23-4 
10
 Ibid. pp. 10-32, 88-107 
11
 Ibid. pp. 88-91 
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World War II. Nolte’s philosophical-historical approach sees fascism as existing in three 
separate environments: political, social, and metapolitical. On the political level of analysis 
fascism is opposed to individual and class-based liberation as advocated by liberalism and 
Marxism respectively while simultaneously embracing the radicalism and opposition to the 
status-quo of both. This assessment is to a large extent based upon Benito Mussolini’s outline of 
the Fascist Party’s ideology which attacks liberal democracy as excessively pacifist and hence 
not conducive to the moral development of nations.
12
 On the social level Nolte’s fascism 
embraces a reactionary willingness to defend one’s interests; while on the metapolitical level it 
finds itself in a state of struggle against transcendence.
13
 Transcendence is here defined as the 
fundamentally modern social process through which human interactions are broadened while 
being rendered more abstract and subtle.
14
 So focused is Nolte’s method on a philosophical 
analysis of disembodied ideas that economic and social explanations of the rise of fascism are 
therein virtually disregarded. Though the phenomenological approach used by Nolte would go 
on to be abandoned by historians and political theorists alike, the idea that fascism was opposed 
to modernity would inform the debate for years to come.  
American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset saw fascism as a revolution of the middle 
class and argued that fascism originated not from the specific circumstances of interwar Europe 
but rather from more universal currents that existed within capitalist industrial society in general. 
In societies experiencing industrialization, Lipset argued, there would always exist disaffected 
elements among either the working class, independent small businessmen facing competition 
                                                          
12
 Indeed, Nolte’s heavy reliance on the propaganda of interwar fascists has drawn the criticism of Ian Kershaw; 
Peter Davis and Derek Lynch, The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right, (Routledge: New York, 
2002) 
13
 Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, (Widenfeld & Nicolson: London, 1965), pp. 429-30, 433-4, 450-4 in ed. 
Roger Griffin, International Fascism: Theories, Causes, and the New Consensus,  (Oxford University Press: New 
York, 1998) 
14
 Ibid. 
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from organized labor and large bureaucracies, or conservatives interested in safeguarding the old 
order against socialist and liberal influence. According to this view, the inherently opportunistic 
fascists would appeal to members of all these groups to degrees that varied depending on specific 
circumstances.
15
 Although Lipset’s analysis is not a Marxist one, it shares with Marxist 
definitions a level of determinism that considers fascism to be an outcome of general underlying 
trends rather than specific circumstances. Marxist understandings of fascism that are not 
explicitly political in nature (i.e. ones not originating from the interwar Communist International) 
are hard to come by. There do exist, however, some structural Marxist explanation of fascism, 
one of which can be found in the writing of Nicos Poulantzas who in the 1970s saw the 
emergence of fascism as a direct consequence of a crisis of international capitalism. To 
Poulantzas, fascism was not a deliberate emergency response of “the most reactionary, 
chauvinistic, and imperialistic elements of finance capital” to pre-revolutionary European 
developments as Moscow had suggested, but an “exceptional state,” a form of capitalist society 
which sets aside class conflicts in order to face external crisis. Analyzing the developments in 
pre-war Germany and Italy, Poulantzas pointed to late-arriving industrialization as an imperative 
factor in the rise of fascism.
16
 
Whereas questions of anti-modernity generally gave way to analyses of internal 
ideological considerations, a problem that continues to divide the historical and theoretic 
community lies in the challenge of classifying fascism within broader ideological currents. This 
question is evident in what here will be referred to as the political religions debate, a dispute that 
intensified in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Roger Griffin, who in 
                                                          
15
 Seymour Martin Lipset, “’Fascism’ – Left, Right and Centre,” pp. 131 in ed. Griffin, International Fascism 
16
 Jane Caplan, “Theories of Fascism: Nicos Poulantzas as Historian Nicos Poulantzas,” History Workshop No. 3 
(Spring, 1977), pp. 83-100  Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism, pp. 
312-9, 331-5, in Griffin, International Fascism 
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1991 argued that classifying fascism as a political religion ascribes to it a pre-modern 
irrationality reminiscent of Robespierre’s Cult of the Supreme Being,17 has, along with Payne 
come to embrace the concept while Eatwell, Passmore and one of the leading historians of Nazi 
Germany, Ian Kershaw, tend to question it.
18
 The concept of secular political religion can be 
traced to Eric Voegelin and Raymond Aron’s writing around the time of the Second World War. 
In 1944 Aron proposed “to call secular religions the doctrines that in the souls of our 
contemporaries take the place of a vanished faith, and that locate humanity's salvation in this 
world, in the distant future, in the form of a social order that has to be created."
19
 The analytical 
concept of political religions remained largely dormant for half a century before it reemerged in 
the writings of Emilio Gentile, a cultural historian of fascism, specifically its Italian iteration. In 
defining the generic idea of political religion, Gentile stresses the importance of a collective 
secular entity, a uniform and codified set of individual obligations vis-à-vis the state, an elite 
cadre that outlines its own mission as the betterment of the collective, as well as the primacy of 
mythology and secular worship of leadership.
20
 Mussolini explicitly claimed that his political 
ideology was not intended to supplant the role of the Church in the hearts of the Italian people, 
Gentile, however, argues that the regime’s recognition of the Vatican was pragmatic in nature 
and reflected the Fascists’ use of religion as their instrumentum regni. Embracing the role of 
religion in shaping morality, fascism sacralizes the social role of the state by “[taking] upon itself 
the prerogative of defining the meaning and ultimate aim as regards the lives of millions of men 
                                                          
17
 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, pp. 30-2. Griffin and Payne have come to stress the heuristic value of the concept 
of political religion in understanding fascism, especially its ultra-nationalism. See: Stanley Payne, “On the Heuristic 
Value of the Concept of Political Religion and its Application,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 
Volume 6, Issue 2, (September 2005), pp. 163-74 
18
 Passmore, Fascism, pp. 20-3; and David D. Roberts, “'Political Religion' and the Totalitarian Departures of Inter-
War Europe: On the Uses and Disadvantages of an Analytical Category,” Contemporary European History,  Vol. 
18, No. 4 (Nov., 2009), pp. 381-3 
19
 Philippe Burrin, “Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept,” History and Memory, Vol. 9, No. 1/2, (Fall 
1997), p. 325 
20
 Roberts, “'Political Religion,’” pp. 382-3 
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and women.”21 A vital component of Gentile’s assessment is that fascism and Nazism were not 
the only political systems that established religious or quasi-religious ideologies to justify their 
mission and their very existence. Creation of similar secular cults, he argues, can additionally be 
attributed to romantic nationalism, liberal democracy, as well as socialism and communism.
22
 It 
is because of the above assertion that the political religions model has been accused of being a 
faddish reconceptualization of the earlier academic current of totalitarianism.
23
 
Deriving its name from the term “total state,” used during the interwar period to describe 
Fascist Italy, totalitarianist
24
 theories focus on the state’s far-reaching control of the private 
sphere of citizens’ lives. Prominent British historian of the Third Reich and advocate of the use 
of political religion as a tool for understanding Nazism and fascism, Michael Burleigh echoes the 
totalitarianist approach in asserting that Hitler and Stalin were guilty of a strikingly similar 
abandonment of traditional moral norms founded on “transcendental authority or natural law” in 
instituting their regimes. Evidence for the Nazi and Soviet drive to create entirely new moral 
systems, Burleigh argues, can be found, for example, in their rejection of the privacy of familial 
relations.
25
 Among the many critics of totalitarianist historiography, Passmore argues that the 
approach is theoretically weak when it comes to proposing reasons for the rise of fascism as it 
                                                          
21
 Emilio Gentile, “Fascism as Political Religion,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 25, No. 2/3 (May - Jun., 
1990), pp. 229-235.  
22
 Ibid.  
23
 Roberts, “'Political Religion,’” pp. 381-414. In addition to citing Ian Kershaw, Roberts himself is highly critical of 
the concept as he argues that by describing the phenomena of interwar fascism and Stalinism in familiar terms of 
religion, the theorists obscure deeper intellectual challenges.  
24
 I choose to use the term “totalitarianist” as an adjective signifying relation to academic theories of totalitarianism 
so as to differentiate it from “totalitarian” which describes policy and ideology. 
25
 Michael Burleigh, “Brotherly Enemies” in Moral Combat: Good and Evil in World War II, (Harper Perennial: 
New York, 2011), pp. 76-114. Burleigh points out parallels in the scientific, or scientising, foundations upon which 
Nazism and Soviet Communism were founded, writing that the vocabulary of Marxism and Nazism mimicked 
science in “in the way that kitsch mimics art. (p. 81).” The Nazi state’s control over the German family is detailed in 
“Part III” of Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann’s The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945, (Cambridge University 
Press: New York, 1993), 199-304 
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focuses almost exclusively on the policy and ideology of fascists already in power.
26
 The 
approach enjoyed a much greater level of popularity in the 1980s when totalitarianism informed 
the stances of right-leaning historians during the German Historikerstreit, or historians’ dispute. 
The quarrel, though concerned primarily with the origins of the Final Solution and the 
relationship between history and identity, saw conservative historians (including the above-
discussed Ernst Nolte) invoke ideas of totalitarianism to draw lines of comparison between Nazi 
and Soviet crimes while their left-wing opponents proposed that the Holocaust was a product of 
the unique evil of Nazi fascism.
27
  
When the vitriolic letters to the editor of the Historikerstreit were being published, the 
popularity of totalitarianism was already waning after it vied for academic hegemony with 
theories focused on modernity in the 1960s and 70s. Karl Dietrich Bracher, for example, argued 
that threats to liberty and democracy originated on both the right and the left of the political 
spectrum. It is imperative to note that totalitarianism was, during pre-Détente Cold War, both an 
analytical tool and a political weapon. The totalitarian minimum put forth by Carl Friedrich 
holds that totalitarian systems are characterized by the indistinguishability of the ruling party and 
the government, the use of police state tactics, government control of information outlets, central 
economic planning, and an elaborate underlying dogma.
28
 It may well be true that fascist states 
and the USSR did share these aspects, but the conscious reduction of the systems to the above 
characteristics allowed anti-Communists to exploit the near-universal moral opposition to 
fascism that characterized postwar democratic Europe to marginalize its erstwhile Soviet ally and 
its supporters. This assessment of Cold War historiography has gained almost universal 
acceptance, even among non-Communist (or perhaps anti-Communist) historians like Michael 
                                                          
26
 Passmore, Fascism, pp. 18-23 
27
 Burleigh and Wippermann, , pp. 19-21 
28
 Passmore, Fascism, pp. 18-9 
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Burleigh.
29
 Nevertheless, the academic study of fascism owes much to the idea of totalitarianism 
as Hannah Arendt’s 1951 book The Origins of Totalitarianism is often credited with being the 
singularity from which sprang the interdisciplinary interest in fascism. Totalitarian movements 
by which Arendt generally means Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany (although she does write that 
Fascist Italy joined their ranks in 1938 with the adoption of racial laws) are characterized by a 
tendency to organize allegedly politically indifferent masses. As an alliance of an elite vanguard 
and an often nihilistic but always disaffected mob, totalitarian movements rely on the power of 
propaganda and terror to secure mass support.
30
 Once in power, writes Arendt, totalitarian 
movements aim to maintain continual instability and regress down a road of increasing 
oppression that culminates in the destruction of humans as moral beings.
31
 While The Origins of 
Totalitarianism is widely considered influential, it is important to note that it would take until the 
late 1950s for writers such as Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski to publish their works inspired 
by Arendt’s theories and until the next decade for early comparative studies of fascism (such as 
Nolte’s) to emerge.32  
Indeed, the period of roughly a decade that separated Allied victory in Europe and the 
crystallization of totalitarianist thought following the Soviet Invasion of Hungary in 1956 was a 
time when fascism and any interest therein faced such overwhelming moral condemnation that it 
was in effect relegated to what Nolte described as “extra-terrestrial exile.”33 Much of what 
follows is an analysis of the use of the term “fascist” during this interval, a period when memory 
                                                          
29
 Allardyce, What Fascism is Not, p. 371; Burleigh and Wippermann, p. 21 
30
 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (The World Publishing Company: Cleveland and New York, 
1958), pp. 306-88 
31
 Ibid. pp. 392-459 
32
 By this I do not mean in any way that scholarship regarding the Second World War and Nazism/fascism did not 
exist in the war’s direct aftermath, rather that studies of fascism as a political ideology (not as a concept tied directly 
to the person of Adolf Hitler, such as Alan Bullock’s work) did not yet emerge.  
33
 Nolte, “The Problem of Fascism in Recent Scholarship,” in Henry A. Turner, Reappraisals of Fascism, (New 
Viewpoints: New York, 1975), pp. 26-42 cited in Davis and Lynch, Fascism and the Far Right 
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of the recent war’s immense destruction provided the foundation upon which the meaning of 
fascism was constructed. The following is an analysis of the concept of fascism as a term of 
abuse in political discourse, a concept warned of by fascism theorists with ubiquity similar to 
their rejection of Cold War totalitarianism. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“A fiery movement / was born in Saint-Céré,” proclaim the opening lines of a song co-composed 
by Pierre Poujade and an author whose name has been lost.
1
 Located in the department of Lot in 
southwestern France, the town of Saint-Céré is home to around 3,500 people, a population level 
largely unchanged since the French Revolution. One hundred miles from Bordeaux to the west 
and Toulouse to the south, it is a picturesque town built in the foothills of the Massif Central on 
the waterfront of the Céré River, its setting and architecture earning it the moniker of la Petite 
Venise Lotoise. Site of the 1953 tax revolt that became Le Mouvement Poujade,
2
 the town has a 
rue Pierre Poujade though it is not one of its many cobblestone avenues but rather a forest road 
with only three street addresses. Saint-Céré’s official website is further indicative of an uneasy 
relationship between the town and one of its most famous modern sons: a list of notable local 
personalities features renaissance poets, a host of military personages, and a Belgian inventor 
who died in Saint-Céré; Poujade’s name, however, is nowhere to be found.3 
Poujade’s political party, Union et fraternité française (UFF), an extension of his protest 
movement of small shopkeepers and artisans, Union de défense des commerçants et artisans 
(UDCA), burst onto the political stage of France’s Fourth Republic (1946-1958) on January 2, 
1956 when close to 13% of the electorate sent 52 of his partisans to the Palais Bourbon’s 
hémicycle. In Le Figaro, the results of the election were published next to a photograph of flames 
spewing forth from the uppermost level of the Eiffel Tower, meanwhile, news of the subsequent 
investiture of Guy Mollet’s cabinet was published among reports of a cold snap that froze the 
                                                          
1
 “Hymne de Marche de l’U.D.C.A,” infos28Paris , http://www.idhm.eu/infos28 
2
 “Le Mouvement Poujade,” “UDCA” and “Poujadists” shall in this paper be used interchangeably. 
3
 “Un peu d'histoire,”  http://www.saint-cere.fr 
- 17 - 
 
Seine to depths not seen since the Great War and allowed Warsaw and Moscow to boast of 
higher temperatures than Marseille and Toulouse.
4
 The bitter cold and burning landmarks only 
made tangible and visible a much larger crisis facing France. French control of Indochina was 
already lost, Algeria’s war of independence was in full swing, and the Republic’s  parliamentary 
system’s hopeless ineffectiveness was growing more demonstrable with every new prime 
minister: Mollet was the twelfth in ten years. In search of a solution, the French electorate turned 
to the extremes. With a platform consisting of one, rather obscure goal - the convocation of the 
Estates General-- the Poujadists’ unique antiparliamentarism and the more well-established 
antiparliamentarism of the communist left accounted for over a third of the vote. Support for the 
French Communist Party (PCF) would never again represent a plurality and the Poujadists would 
quickly slide into obscurity. The various catalysts of Le Mouvement Poujade’s rapid growth, 
from issues of decolonization, to the social changes that accompanied France’s postwar 
modernization, to persistent governmental instability overshadowed the movement’s activity in 
its time and have likewise come to greatly diminish the level of attention devoted to the UDCA 
in histories of the Fourth Republic. 
Pierre Poujade, a man who, in the words of the Hymne de marche de l’U.D.C.A set out to 
“Save the Republic / and the Nation’s honor,” occupies in the history of postwar France a place 
comparable to that of a remarkably quotable footnote. Poujade left behind a political legacy that 
amounts to little more than his last name being the grammatical root of poujadisme, a term used 
to mockingly describe right wing populist attitudes built on fears of social and economic change. 
Right wing populist political parties like Nigel Farage’s United Kingdom Independence Party or 
decentralized movements such as the Tea Party protests of the first decade of the twenty-first 
                                                          
4
 Le Figaro, Jan. 4 and 20-24, 1956; I must admit, I owe the idea for this characterization of January, 1956 to 
Alistair Horne and his masterful Savage War of Peace, p. 126. 
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century have often been—notably by Robert Zaretsky in a 2010 New York Times editorial—
compared to, or rather accused of, Poujadism.
5
 In the mid-1950s, when the label Poujadism was 
understandably not yet conceived of, Pierre Poujade’s movement was, at the highpoint of its 
political popularity, accused of fascism, an ideology which in hindsight seems by all measures 
far more sinister. It is with these accusations that this thesis is concerned.  
The first historical study of the UDCA and of Poujadism was published only months after 
its electoral success. Stanley Hoffman’s Le Mouvement Poujade emphasized the movement’s 
anti-modernism and anti-elitism which according to the author were rooted in ‘nostalgia for a 
golden age when the little Poujade could work in a little garden in his little village without any 
contact with overarching state structures.’ In his chronology of the movement’s growth and 
development, Hoffmann emphasizes its “attacks on the pays légal,” thus implicitly linking its 
ideology with the political philosophy of Charles Maurras.
6
 The book is composed of two 
distinct parts, the first of these provides a chronological analysis of the movement’s growth and 
development, exploring its tactics of recruitment and strategies of expansion; the second 
provides an investigation of the movement’s ideological framework and political makeup. 
Charges of fascism directed at the movement are difficult to avoid and Hoffmann addresses these 
briefly, suggesting that the Poujadists’ fundamentally negative view of the state as a political 
actor rendered its ideology wholly incompatible with fascism which he defines as a political 
system constructed around a cult of the state. The France of the “petits,” he argues, was 
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incapable of accommodating fascism as it was too closely in line with the girondist tradition of 
revolutionary republican conservatism.
7
 
Sean Fitzgerald’s 1970 study, “The Anti-Modern Rhetoric of Le Mouvement Poujade” 
can inform, albeit indirectly, an analysis of fascism accusations leveled against Poujade. 
Fitzgerald highlights the many, at times contradictory, elements of the Poujadist platform and 
argues that internal ideological inconsistencies can be resolved by emphasizing instead the 
‘common denominator provided by anti-modernism,’ a trait which at the time of the Movement’s 
activity few devoted much attention to as the political implications of its potential success were 
scrutinized more widely than its ideological motivations.
8
 Anti-modernism was most clearly 
expressed in Poujade’s allusions to the omnipresent specter of the System, a diabolical, inhuman 
force associated with international financial organizations and ‘anonymous and vagabond 
capital.’ So ubiquitous was the inherently capitalist System’s control in the eyes of Poujadists, 
writes Fitzgerald, that even the Kremlin was of its creation at a time when France, ‘having 
become the laughing stock of the entire world ... [found] herself at the total mercy of Anglo-
Saxon imperialism or Russian imperialism.’ According to this rhetoric, French humiliation began 
in 1940, was further manifest in Indochina, exacerbated by the emergence of Arab Nationalism, 
and continued with the loss of national sovereignty at the hands of NATO, the United Nations, 
and European organizations. This steady decline was not of French making but was rather a 
product of the System’s collusion with the international community to ‘dispose of France and her 
riches.’9  In March, 1955, Fraternité française, the UDCA’s print publication proclaimed that the 
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world which the System sought to create was one where ‘[the machine was god] and production 
the religion. The soul, the sentiments, tradition, [and] Man will simply matter no more.’10 
In Petits Bourgeois en Revolte?, Dominique Borne provides an historical analysis similar 
to Hoffmann’s in both structure and conclusion. What differs, however, is the amount of time 
elapsed since the Poujadists were active and the perspective offered by its 1977 publication 
allows Borne to consider Poujadism in the additional contexts of the Algerian War and the rise of 
de Gaulle, both of which helped bring about UDCA’s rapid descent into obscurity. Borne’s 
account concludes with an attempt to locate Le Mouvement Poujade within some ideological 
continuum, whether among the far-right antiparliamentary leagues of the interwar period,  the 
current of French radicalism or reactionism, or among fascist and neo-fascist movements. With 
aspects of all above ideologies discernible within Poujadism, Borne selects neither.
11
  
James Shields’ “The Poujadist Movement: a Faux ‘Fascism,” is the only academic 
inquiry to address directly the question of whether Le Mouvement Poujade was indeed a fascist 
program. Shields outlines the movement’s history and its ideological transition from an 
economic protest to a political party whose national agenda ranged from combating a corrupt 
system, to the reassertion of the importance of traditional French values, to a wholehearted 
commitment to all that Algérie française stood for.
12
 The shift from economic activism to 
political campaigning brought about the exodus of communists who had joined the UDCA 
(Union de défense des commerçants et artisans) in large numbers in its early days. Once free of 
its ideologically incompatible Communist associates, “Poujadism began to serve as a magnet for 
                                                          
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Dominique Borne, Petits Bourgeois en Révolte?: Le Mouvement Poujade, (Flammarion: Paris, 1977), pp. 181-99 
12
 James G. Shields, “The Poujadist Movement: a Faux ‘Fascism,” Modern & Contemporary France, Vol. 8, Is. 1 
(2000), p. 19 
- 21 - 
 
ex-Vichyites, neo-fascists, and ultra-nationalists wishing to destabilize the regime and keen to 
exploit the “fascist tendencies” of Poujade’s movement.”13  
Within the party’s ideology Shields sees further evidence of tendencies that could 
potentially strengthen the case of those seeking to brand the movement as fascist. Heightened 
nationalism, exemplified by the Poujadists’ staunch opposition to decolonization, serves as one 
piece of such evidence. Moreover, Poujade’s references to Maurice Barrès’ romantic anti-
intellectualism and Maurras’ distinction between a “real” national community and the artificial 
state structure imposed thereupon suggest that the movement can be placed within the continuity 
of the French radical Right. Shields also discusses Poujade’s Anti-Semitism at length, this trait 
serves as a further connection between Poujade and the anti-Dreyfusard Right as attacks on 
Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France often paid little attention to  his leftist political alignment 
and focused rather on his Jewish identity.
14
   
In the end, having demonstrated Poujade’s sympathetic view of French democratic 
traditions and his purge of the most radical Right-wing members of the party, Shields, much like 
Hoffman before him, arrives at the conclusion that Poujadism was “too Girondist to 
accommodate any sympathy for a totalitarian state” and that it was not fascist “in the sense of 
combining nationalism with socialist economic principles.” Poujadism was internally 
contradictory, attempting to bridge the gap between two distinct currents in traditional French 
politics, revolutionary republicanism and conservative nationalism. Shields is therefore inclined 
to echo Maurice Bardèche—an author who would have presumably known the subject well as 
                                                          
13
 Ibid. p. 28 
14
 Ibid. pp. 24-6 
- 22 - 
 
his 1961 book opens with the words “Je suis un écrivain fasciste”—in dubbing Poujadism a 
“faux fascism.”15  
James Shields revisited the topic in 2004, shortly after the movement celebrated its 
semicentennial. In “An Enigma Still, Poujadism Fifty Years On,” the historian is less concerned 
with the accusations of fascism of the 1950s than he is with later academic applications of such a 
label and with his own attempt to classify the movement within some political framework, be it 
right wing, extreme-right, or right wing populist. Unable to locate the movement definitively 
within Jacobinism or “classic xenophobe anti-parliamentarism (of the left or right)”, Jean 
Touchard and Pierre Milza both argued that, if Poujadism wasn’t fascist, it was at least 
potentially fascist. Shields maintains that such a suggestion overlooks three objections: 
Poujadism lacked a clear ideological doctrine, it defended “a backward-looking status quo,” 
while its audience was largely apolitical and held an attitude that was ‘at its core one of 
indifference, suspicion or hostility’ toward the state and politics.16 The argument that Poujadism 
lacked a level of ideological conviction necessitated by fascism (also used by Shields to push 
against Seymour Martin Lipset’s assertion that the UDCA’s ‘ideology was like that of the 
Nazis’) again echoes Bardèche who saw its doctrinal roots in democratic-Marxist civic activism 
and not in the fascist political projects of the interwar years.
17
 ‘Nous sommes inclassables’ was 
Poujade’s assessment of his movement’s location on the political spectrum; Shields tends to 
agree, writing that the movement was a “classically contradictory” populism. The UDCA’s 
fiftieth anniversary commemoration in Saint-Céré was a perfect illustration of this populist 
inclination as trade unionists shared a room with business owners while paramilitary activists of 
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the Organisation de l'armée secrète and Front National politicians (Jean-Marie Le Pen, notably, 
was not invited) mingled with former Gaullist deputies.
18
 
The purpose of this paper will not be to reexamine the philosophy of Poujadism for the 
purpose of definitively establishing whether the accusations of fascism leveled against Le 
Mouvement Poujade were indeed valid. Its goal shall instead be to examine both the movement 
and the accusations leveled against it at the time in their historical context in order to determine 
how the use of the concept of fascism was influenced by the realities of the 1950s. Although, as 
historians have suggested, some charges of fascism directed against the UDCA and the 
Poujadists were factually grounded, I contend that there was also an entirely baseless category of 
such accusations. Because academic inquiry into its nature was yet to develop as a subfield of 
history and social sciences, fascism in the context of the 1950s was an idea even more nebulous 
than it is today; this consideration combined with the résistancialist anti-fascist ideological 
foundation of the Fourth Republic’s marginalized parliamentary extremes to create a setting 
where fascism was more of a malleable tool of political discourse than a representation of a real 
set of political beliefs.  
My analysis will consist of three parts. The first section will present the social, economic, 
and cultural circumstances that helped bring about the rise of the UDCA. Additionally, this 
section will provide a basic biographical sketch of Pierre Poujade and will examine the 
characteristics of the movement at a time when it garnered neither widespread media attention 
nor political opposition. This corresponds roughly to the period between the summer of 1953 and 
the early spring of 1955 when Poujadism began to evolve into a political program with national 
ambitions. Poujade wrote two autobiographies, J’ai choisi le combat (1955) and A l’heure de la 
colère (1977). In writing this chapter I will rely heavily on the latter and will contextualize its 
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accounts vis-à-vis histories both of the movement and the Fourth Republic. Because it functions 
as an outline of the ideological considerations of what I will refer to as political Poujadism, 
Poujade’s earlier work will figure more prominently in the second chapter. J’ai choisi le combat 
will be supplemented with newspaper accounts from the two French papers of record, Le Monde 
and Le Figaro, as well as the Communist l’Humanité where available. This second section will 
analyze Poujadism during 1955, between the February rally at Vel’ d’Hiv and the election of 
January 2, 1956, as it was during this period that the Poujadists attempted to enter national 
politics and general criticisms as well as accusations of fascism grounded in their ideology, 
membership, and tactics emerged. Finally, the third section will introduce the Résistance Myth 
and propose that in the context of the Fourth Republic, it was this continued recourse to the 
Resistance that accounted for the anti-fascism which informed the use of the word fascist as a 
general term of abuse.  
Newspapers form the majority of primary sources on which this thesis will rely. 
Considering that papers have well-established political leanings—if not levels of open partisan 
affiliation—there is always present a certain amount of partiality that one has to be aware of. 
Although by sheer volume, there is a rather large amount of information on Poujade and on 
accusations of fascism available in Le Monde alone, the right-leaning Le Figaro was selected to 
provide a degree of balance. While newspaper bias is generally not stated forthrightly, it is more 
obvious than in autobiographical works.  Because two such books will be utilized in this paper, a 
discussion of their potential bias is in order. As is corroborated by the fact that historians have 
used it sparingly, the narrative portion of J’ai choisi le combat is not of great value as it deals 
predominantly with the campaigning of the early UDCA.  More important for this paper’s 
purposes is the collection of articles and open letters that comprises its second half. A l’heure de 
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la colère, Poujade’s second book provides useful information on the early life of the UDCA 
president but in its treatment of the movement it, at times, verges on being autohagiographical; 
this might lead one to question the utility of such a work and of autobiographies in general 
within historical research. Like Poujadism itself, the book should be regarded as a response to its 
time. Where the revolt at Saint-Céré was a protest against the economic crisis facing the 1950s 
commerçant, the 1977 book was part of an attempt by Poujade to end his traversée du desert and 
reenter the French political stage in the aftermath of the economic crisis that accompanied the 
end of the prolonged postwar boom. The book’s final chapters are especially valuable when it 
comes to identifying a motive for its publication. After blaming the loss of Algeria on the 
government’s indecisiveness and on the officers’ misplaced political ambition, Poujade goes on 
to declare that he had shared the communists’ opposition to de Gaulle’s constitutional 
referendum. What is notably missing from the account of the period between 1958 and the 
epilogue’s concluding declaration that “the clock has again struck the hour of rage,” are the 
events of May 1968, together with the reassertion of his opposition to the Fifth Republic, this can 
be interpreted as Poujade’s declaration of his openness to lead once again an anti-establishment 
popular movement.
19
 
 When analyzing an autobiographical document such as A l’heure de la colère, it is crucial 
to keep in mind that intentional distortion of facts is certainly a possibility. An autobiography or 
memoir is therefore a unique literary genre that straddles the gap between what can 
conventionally be considered primary and secondary sources, it is history interpreted by one of 
its actors. A l’heure de la colère is an insight into how Poujade, in the specific context of the 
1970s, would have liked the historian to view his life and his movement. Whether Poujade and 
his fellow sympathizers of General Franco took time off from school to fight “co-cos” in 
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Aurillac is as important as the fact that, forty years on, Poujade believed such a narrative to be 
important in forming his own and the UDCA’s political identity. A.J.P. Taylor famously 
remarked that “written memoirs are a form of oral history set down to mislead historians.”20 
Though this is true, if potential instances and sources of bias or even outright manufacture of 
storylines are determined, an autobiographical work is not “useless except for atmosphere.”21 
The use of Poujade’s book is also necessary beyond the biographical background in order to 
provide an account of Poujadism’s early days because the only newspaper to devote any 
attention to it before the fall of 1954 was La Dépêche du Midi, a Toulouse-based publication 
evidently not accessible even to the two major histories of the movement, Stanley Hoffmann’s 
Le Mouvement Poujade, published in 1956, and Dominique Borne’s 1977 Petits Bourgeois en 
Révolte?.  
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Son of an architect and active member of Action française, Pierre Poujade was born in Saint-
Céré in 1920. His political activism began not long thereafter. A l’heure de la colère traces 
Poujade’s dissatisfaction with the rigid right-left divide to a single day in 1936 when, while 
loosely associated with Jacques Doriot’s Parti Populaire Française, at age fifteen, he observed 
that,  
[political divisions] are absurd: I have communist friends, some of whom would consider 
me to be their friend. The difference between us is miniscule. It is however in the name 
of this difference that we try to kill one another. It was at that moment that I laid the 
framework for ‘Poujadism’.1 
Earlier in 1936, Poujade had received his initiation into the world of politics as he and his fellow 
supporters of Francisco Franco on one side and French backers of Republican Spain on the other 
would go to the movie theatre in the nearby town of Aurillac to turn it into a battlefield of the 
Spanish Civil War. It was there that Poujade was for the first time referred to as a “fascist” to 
which he and his compatriots would respond with cries of “co-cos”; oftentimes brawls would 
ensue.
2
 
 As Poujade entered adulthood he worked in Carcassonne in the overland shipping 
industry, an episode which physically “made him a man […] equipped to do great things, but 
where,” he wondered, “had gone the crusading atmosphere of 1936 which so animated [him]?”3  
Then, when he was twenty, war broke out and shortly before France capitulated in June, 1940, 
Poujade attempted to enter a regiment of irregulars to “fire off some of the campaign’s last 
cartridges,” but instead of ammunition the colonel at Cahors offered him a despondent piece of 
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advice: “rentrez chez vous. C’est fini.” “Paul Reynaud’s [June 6] speech and candles at Notre-
Dame all proved useless in stopping Panzers,” writes Poujade, “Pétain spared us the worst.” It 
was le Maréchal to whom the future UDCA leader would give his service until November 11, 
1942. After a brief period of training, the twenty year old Poujade became leader (in his 
estimates the youngest) of a rural company of Compagnons de France, the official youth 
organization of the Vichy Regime, seen by Pétain as the prospective “avant-garde of the National 
Revolution.” As Robert Paxton notes, there were according to German intelligence only 8,000 
Compagnons, far short of the intended 25,000. Aiming to save youths of fifteen to twenty years 
of age from unemployment and political opposition, rural companies of Compagnons put young 
men to work on farms while their urban counterparts served to “unite all social classes.”4  Both 
the Compagnons and the larger Chantiers de la jeunesse française (French Youth Projects) 
accomplished little in the way of youth indoctrination as “a good amount of time was spent 
producing a desperately needed substitute fuel, charcoal.”5  It was in fact to charcoal production, 
charbonisation, that Poujade’s company was assigned near Figeac in his native Lot. So 
successful was his company that after La Dépêche du Midi devoted ten pages—of what Poujade 
was proud to dismiss as propaganda—to praising the company’s productivity it became to the 
Massif Central what Stakhanov was to the Urals, travelling the region’s villages to help farmers 
during the day and to put on theatrical performances in the evenings. Believing that the goal of 
Vichy youth organizations and the Vichy state in general was in fact to rebuild France and her 
society so that at some point down the road they could militarily throw off the German yoke, 
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Poujade’s guiding principle was, according to his later autobiography, “pour le Maréchal—
contre les Nazis.” 
In a 1950 statement that sparked a national controversy, Gilbert Renault—known to his 
fellow members of the French Forces of the Interior as Colonel Rémy—proclaimed that “the 
France of June 1940 needed both Marshal Pétain and General de Gaulle.”6 Poujade, or at least 
the Poujade of 1977, would have disagreed. The Résistance so closely associated with the person 
of Charles de Gaulle plays a rather negligible role in his discussions of the war. Moreover, all 
resistance groups are categorized as communist: 
The Résistance existed [in Lot] too: in the rare instances that the maquisards actually 
took on the Germans militarily (like in the Vercors), the rare times when ‘Résistance’ 
confronted regular enemy troops instead of plunging bullets in the back of the nearest 
bourgeois simply because he was an anticommunist, only in these rare instances were 
these guerillas not simple bandits.
7
 
For Poujade at least, support for the Marshal was the only course of action a self-described 
patriotic Frenchman fortunate enough to reside in the Free Zone could take.  “True resistance” 
was not an option because, according to Poujade, it hardly existed.  Nonetheless, when the 
Germans and Italians jointly occupied all of Vichy France beginning in November of 1942, the 
successful Compagnon leader crossed the Pyrenees. The trek was supposedly made 
unnecessarily difficult because Poujade refused to pay a guide who “called himself a patriot but 
sought compensation for his patriotism.”8 
 After internment in Franco’s Spain, Poujade made his way to Algiers which thanks to the 
success of Operation Torch was under Anglo-American occupation and had, alongside London, 
become one of the two capitals of the Free French organization. In part thanks to an illness 
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prevented him from actively supporting the Royal Air Force which he had joined shortly after 
arrival, Poujade met Yvette Seva, a daughter of a Pied-Noir family, whom he would marry in 
1944. Though Yvette had been baptized a Catholic, her father was a supporter of the French 
Communist Party.  Her marriage to Poujade thus became, in the judgment of historian 
Dominique Borne “an early example of Pierre’s affinity for political syncretism.”9 Such an 
assessment may be ascribing too much to the couple’s union, but Poujade’s new family 
connections might well have provided him with the affinity for colonial control of Algeria that in 
a decade later would be central to the Poujadist espousal of the ideas of “Algérie française,” 
 When World War II ended Pierre, Yvette, and their two young children returned to Saint-
Céré. Poujade then bought the 70 square-foot boutique which in less than a decade’s time would 
be the birthplace of his movement. “Every patriot,” writes Poujade, “whether he was a Gaullist 
from the beginning or loyal to the Marshal, whether he confronted the enemy in the sands of the 
desert or in the skies over England, in Tunisia, in Italy, or in German prison camps, whether he 
fled our county immediately or—like my friends and I—prepared le revanche on the home front, 
had ‘his own” idea of [postwar] France.” Despite his acknowledgement that France was a 
“complex, contradictory, and perpetually divided society,” Poujade’s “idea” was that of national 
unity.  However, just as they had done in 1918, politicians stole the victory from France’s 
soldiers and appropriated it for their own purposes. It was therefore with rage that Poujade 
responded to an article in Le Patriote, southwestern France’s communist-leaning Resistance 
newspaper, which he believed “insinuated” that low ranking Vichy activists including leaders of 
Les Compagnons were guilty of collaboration.
10
 As the newspaper’s “attacks” ceased, Poujade’s 
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anger with the postwar political order persisted; foremost offender was the PCF, which began to 
brand itself the “party of 75,000 fusillés” in reference to the number of communists killed by the 
German occupiers. For Poujade, however, the Communist résistants were not heroes but thugs 
and vigilantes, responsible for the anarchy that plagued 1945. This “anarchy” is undoubtedly a 
reference to the purge of collaborators known as épuration, which in its early stages amounted to 
a wave of summary executions in an atmosphere of general anger. Especially common in the 
southern départements that had comprised the Free Zone, the wave of violence encompassed not 
only executions but also the shaving of women’s heads should they have been compromised with 
the enemy and the painting of swastikas on the houses of alleged collaborators.
11
 The 
“unofficial” stage of épuration was quickly reined in by the Liberation government which, Jean-
Pierre Rieux argues, could have also inflated the numbers of people summarily executed, 
exaggerating the extent of the chaos and thus convincing the population to acquiesce to the new 
leadership.
12
 In his account of the immediate postwar period, however, Poujade suggests that the 
extrajudicial purges were not just a product of communism run amok (as early Cold War 
propaganda interpretations would have it), but stemmed also from the weakness of the 
Provisional Government.
13
 Poujade’s concern with the feebleness of the postwar French state is 
hence evident even before the formation of the Fourth Republic.  
“I have a way of ‘feeling’ my country and my country was not doing well,” wrote 
Poujade in his 1977 autobiography. Reflecting on the events of twenty years earlier he noted that 
“the French empire was falling apart”: this was evident in  Indochina where a full-scale war was 
raging, in Algeria, which was a powder keg waiting to explode, and in the French protectorate of 
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Morocco, one of Poujade’s wartime homes, where king Mohammad V had just been deposed. 
Perhaps even more alarming, “France too was breaking.”14 It was, however, only hindsight that 
allowed Poujade to portray the foundation of his movement as a response to the many crises of 
postwar France. Though the movement would go on to embrace the struggle to save France and 
the “French empire,” it began more modestly, as a protest against the perceived excesses of the 
Fourth Republic’s domestic fiscal policy and more broadly against the socioeconomic conditions 
facing France’s lower middle class. 
 One July evening in 1953, having finished his day’s work at around 10 p.m., Pierre 
Poujade locked the doors of his book store and was engaged in a street side discussion with his 
fellow storeowners on the rue de la République when his “collègue de gauche,” a man named 
Frégeac, an active local communist, jumped off his bike with a terrified expression on his face. 
Addressing Poujade as monsieur, which the former took as an affirmation of the distance 
between their political leanings, Frégeac displayed a government letter announcing an upcoming 
audit, contrôle, of his shoe store.
15
 Contrôles were a dreaded aspect of the postwar French tax 
system, instituted to combat widespread tax evasion which had made of France a “land of 
excessive taxation fortunately tempered by fraud.” Opposition to taxation in the decades 
preceding the Second World War had in fact been so widespread that it reputedly made it 
impossible for the state to balance its budget.
16
 As the postwar government adopted an archaic 
tax system that made the café owner subject to fifteen different tax statutes while the garage 
owner had to deal with twelve, tax evasion continued. According to a 1950 study, as many as 80 
percent of small shopkeepers were engaged in some form of tax fraud, and this figure would not 
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have included such dubious-but-legal practices as paying taxes a year after their due date so as to 
take advantage of high rates of inflation. Though evasion was certainly prevalent, writes Roger 
Eatwell, the popular impression (which he argues permeated into academic circles) that 
shopkeepers were “men of money who paid few taxes” was not entirely correct, for the tax 
system which the commerçant had to navigate was excessively convoluted making accurate 
assessments of liability problematic. Not only was the tax system complicated and simply 
difficult to follow, but the controllers sent from Paris to enforce it were just that: controllers from 
Paris, officials who “had little understanding of the small, rural shopkeeper, a man who lived out 
the ideal of the self-sufficient economic man rather than the profit-maximizing entrepreneur.”17 
 According to Poujade, the audits were an inevitable consequence of a “weak state” 
because in such a state “the men who pretend to govern” have to resort to tyranny, in this case, 
the tyranny was fiscal. “With spite and malicious pleasure,” he continues, “the state looked for 
money where it could not possibly find it: among the shopkeepers and artisans.”18 While it may 
be rather difficult to assess how much enjoyment government controllers extracted from their 
audits of small-businessmen, it is true that the 1950s brought about a gradual decrease in the 
economic wellbeing of minor proprietors. In an analysis of the economic causes of the rise of Le 
Mouvement Poujade, Dominique Borne presents the deteriorating circumstances someone like le 
petit papetier de Saint-Céré would have faced as Europe entered the second postwar decade. In 
1950, there were in France nineteen small commercial establishments per 1,000 inhabitants, in 
West Germany and Great Britain there were only twelve.
19
 Small businesses had in fact 
increased in number in the immediate aftermath of the war as general shortages fostered 
artificially large profit margins. Coupled with steady increases in prices independent of inflation, 
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shortages allowed some commerçants to amass considerable wealth which in turn brought about 
accusations of black market profiteering.   Hence a “largely unfavorable public image of the 
profession” was in place by the early 1950s. In the 1950s, however, the retail market share held 
by chain stores steadily increased from under ten percent in 1950 to over thirteen by 1958, the 
number of various small shops decreased commensurately. Around 20,000 (6%) grocers left their 
trade federation in the interval, the decrease was even more dramatic among bakers (10,000—
32%) and café owners (49,000—26%).20  
 To the shopkeeper, the small shop was not just a source of livelihood but also an 
inherently French institution, an aspect of culture with which the supermarket or chain store 
(generally identified as “American” with no real consideration of its actual ownership) could 
simply not be reconciled. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War anti-
Americanism was primarily associated with the French Communist Party (PCF) and more 
generally with the anti-capitalist left. This sentiment would reach its apex in 1952 with 
communist-led demonstrations against the visit of General Matthew Ridgeway and the 
subsequent affaire des pigeons, an episode which resulted in the arrest of Communist leader 
Jacques Duclos, in the trunk of whose car a crate of pigeons allegedly used to communicate with 
Moscow had been found. Though the affair—rather surprisingly—discredited the Communists 
and not the Pinay cabinet,
21
 anti-American sentiment remained, and it was not solely an attitude 
of the working class and their representatives but also that of the middle class artisans and 
shopkeepers who constituted the core of Poujade’s supporters. The coq gaulois of the UDCA 
emblem might have faced off against the American eagle, as Rod Kedward puts it, but it should 
be stressed that when Poujade spoke of France becoming the laughing stock of the entire world 
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and “[finding] herself at the total mercy of Anglo-Saxon imperialism,”22 he was playing on an 
attitude already well-established among his movement’s supporters.  
Anti-Americanism among the French can be traced as far back as the July Monarchy 
when egalitarian ideas of European proto-socialism were first regarded as antithetical to 
American individualism. The sentiment would subsequently be adopted by elements of the 
reactionary right opposed to the increased American influence that accompanied the industrial 
boom of the Gilded Age. Following the Wall Street crash of 1929 there would emerge references 
to le cancer américain.
23
 In a 1952 article on French anti-Americanism, Arnold Rose cited a 
series of public opinion polls according to which 50 percent of respondents from all walks of life 
no longer saw France as an independent nation in terms of foreign affairs while only 25 percent 
saw Marshall Plan aid as a “good thing.”24 In addition to a degree of latent pro-Russian (though 
not necessarily pro-Soviet) sentiment, Rose points to the inherent conservatism and 
traditionalism of the entirety of France’s non-communist political spectrum as a cause of 
opposition to American influence and the country’s industrial backwardness alike.25 Accounts of 
this conservatism, asserts Rose, can most notably be found in Marc Bloch’s Strange Defeat 
wherein the historian and résistant argues that ideas of agrarian utopianism and denunciations of 
progress predated the defeat and the Vichy state.
26
 
 The decline in the number of small shopkeepers was not only a function of their inability 
to compete with larger merchants, but resulted also—specifically in rural regions—from the 
country’s rapid and profound modernization. A crucial aspect of France’s postwar recovery and 
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the subsequent period of economic growth was a quick return to prewar agricultural outputs 
which would then go on to double over the Fourth Republic’s brief period of existence. By 
mechanizing farms and through an effort, albeit slow, to bring together small plots of land, yields 
of French farmland caught up with those of the rest of Western Europe almost immediately after 
liberation. Every year beginning in 1950 one percent of the French population would leave the 
agricultural workforce, and as Jean-Pierre Rieux writes, this development “indirectly helped 
progress elsewhere in the economy.”27 While those who remained in the agricultural sector 
became comparatively better off, the converse was quite predictably the fate of other sectors of 
the rural economy. As erstwhile peasants moved to cities and towns, rural shopkeepers lost their 
sources of revenue to depopulation; it was among these comparative losers of modernization and 
industrialization that Poujade would find a base of supporters. Stanley Hoffmann’s Le 
Mouvement Poujade corroborates this with a chart showing that  of Poujade’s first twelve 
“conquered” départements all but two experienced a decline in population ranging from -2.6 
percent in Dordogne to -9 percent in Lozère.
28
 What should be noted here is that early Poujadist 
protests were strictly a reaction to the economic conditions facing the rural lower middle class of 
the Fourth Republic; they were not part of a grand political project. France in the 1950s was a 
state where despite the return to power of liberal politicians and the re-emergence of strong 
capitalist tendencies, the state pursued a strongly interventionist economic policy.
29
 It was only 
in 1955 that the Poujadists began to focus their attacks on specific politicians (most notably 
Pierre Mendès-France) under the slogan of sortez les sortants.  The early Union de défense des 
commerçants et artisans defended its members against the disembodied concept of fiscal 
oppression.  
                                                          
27
 Rieux, The Fourth Republic, pp. 317-20 
28
 Stanley Hoffmann, Le Mouvemnet Poujade, (Librarie Armad Colin: Paris, 1956), p. 12 
29
 Rieux, The Fourth Republic, pp. 336-43 
- 37 - 
 
 On October 19, 1953 after the initial success of the movement in bringing about an end to 
audits across Lot, the protesters, not known as the UDCA or even Poujadists quite yet, held their 
first major party meeting in Gramat, a town five miles southwest of Saint-Céré. The main 
accomplishment of the conference was its adoption of an eight point platform. The first point 
called for equal taxation of all shopkeepers and artisans while point two demanded that small 
shopkeepers’ tax dues be equal to those of stores with multiple branches because, “while 
commerçants have to buy a license to sell a product, large stores do not pay more than the value 
of two of these licenses to sell several dozen of an article;” equal taxation was also called for vis-
à-vis cooperatives, especially those in part supported by the state. Third on the platform was a 
call for a single tax base, a simplification of the tax code would curb fraud, the document argues, 
while at the same time reducing paperwork and the need for audits; a tax allowance of 360,000 
francs was also to be granted to “all qualified shopkeepers.” Next came a call for a complete end 
to all fiscal controls and for immediate tax amnesty, and finally a demand for equal rights and 
responsibilities with regard to social security and more broadly “the development of a system 
founded on the equality of all Frenchmen.”30 The demands of the Gramat congress were related 
strictly to the economy and almost exclusively to fiscal concerns while it also called for a second 
assembly to take place in Cahors in late November in order to officially constitute a political 
movement.  
 November 29, 1953 marked the official beginning of operation of Union des 
commerçants et des artisans du Lot. It was at Cahors that Poujade was elected to lead the 
movement in what was notably not a unanimous decision:   some of the older members of the 
Union deemed the stationer too young, too inexperienced, and lacking the proper manners 
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necessary to negotiate with the upper echelons of French politics.
31
 The Cahors Municipal 
Theatre was the site of what Poujade casts as the most important decision in the movement’s 
short history, the creation of a newspaper which was initially met with fierce opposition as it 
required all members to pay a single 300 francs due. With the motion adopted, the newly-
appointed president proceeded cry “à la préfecture!” Requesting that the prefect of Cahors 
recognize and register the movement was a pro forma action that in Poujade’s judgment was to 
place the movement within a continuity of spontaneous revolutionary manifestations which 
always “demanded the approval of the prefect.”32 When a clerk informed the crowd that the 
government official was busy, Poujade climbed a scaffolding that surrounded the tower of the 
Cahors Cathedral and proceeded to shout the Union’s policies directly into the window of the 
official’s house. With the theatre located almost exactly between the Prefecture du Lot and the 
Cathedral, the group of 300 delegates who attended the assembly would have marched back and 
forth down Léon Gambetta Boulevard, the town’s main artery, and together with the large police 
presence undoubtedly provided quite a curiosity on a quiet Sunday afternoon. If later criticism of 
Poujade was well-grounded and the movement was in fact classifiable as part of the extreme 
right, it seems highly ironic that such a movement would have been founded in the birthplace of- 
and on a street named after Gambetta, one of the founders of the Third Republic, a political 
entity whose perceived decadence drew critics from across the right for seventy years.  
Cahors was not only the legal birthplace of the Poujadist movement but also the site of 
the first noted dissent in its ranks as Hoffmann cites a speech given by a Saint-Céré pharmacist 
named Dafour, one of the most active participants in the protests of the preceding summer, who 
invoked the fable of a jay dressed in a peacock’s plumage and warned the assembly that Poujade 
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would take the shopkeepers further than any of them would ever want to go.
33
 Rare instances of 
dissent notwithstanding, the remainder of 1953 and the beginning of 1954 were a time of 
uninterrupted success for Poujade and his movement. Two weeks after Christmas of 1953 the 
elections to chambers of commerce across Lot marked the first electoral successes of the 
Poujadist movement. The four-man list headed by Pierre Poujade received 60% of the vote in 
Cahors: “the four musketeers crushed their spineless adversaries.” A week later the fifth and 
final seat was up for election and a personal friend of Poujade named Vert defeated his 
incumbent opponent, receiving 80% of the vote and leading the party leader to proclaim that, 
“[t]he impossible had been realized, the shopkeepers were unleashed and took down the 
mandarins.”34 The tactics used by the Poujadists (and in particular their leader) were called into 
question in the aftermath of the election when the president of the Lot Chamber of Commerce 
Roger Estival accused Poujade of using the discontent of the middle class for personal gains 
while at the same time showing no restraint in appealing to communists for support.
35
 Poujade is 
forthright about his cooperation with PCF members in the movement’s early days, writing that it 
was during this period that “the Cossacks,” as he referred to them, taught him the strategies he 
would go on to use in his fight against international trusts.
36 
Between January and early May 
Poujade travelled between the departments adjacent to Lot, setting up provisional bureaus that 
local activists would then turn into unions which in policy and structure resembled that 
established in Cahors: under the direction of Francis Bos in Aurillac the Union du Cantal was 
constituted in early April, Aveyron followed days later. It was perhaps in Poujade’s hands-on 
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approach to expansion and the lack of regional autonomy that early accusations of an 
authoritarian party structure were grounded.  
 The movement’s expansion across the southwest of France went largely unnoticed from 
the point of view of large national newspapers, until, that is, it moved northward into Corrèze. 
After giving speeches in small towns along the southern boundary of the department Poujade 
travelled to Allassac, a town of close to 4,000 inhabitants, where 400 shopkeepers and artisans 
took to the streets to protest against fiscal excesses (contrôles began in the region in early 1954). 
Three days later, on April 24, Poujade made his way to Brive, a town of close to 34,000, by far 
the most populous in the department and the biggest to hold a Poujadist rally until that point. 
Concerned with the possible spread of anti-tax protests to the city, the Brive Chamber of 
Commerce requested that the French National Assembly “study the problems facing small 
business owners.”37 No large rally materialized as only 300 people from northern Corrèze were 
in attendance.
38
 Poujade suggests that the movement grew rapidly in the early parts of 1954 
because France was surpassing all imaginable limits of national humiliation as the situation in 
Southeast Asia—and at Dien Bien Phu in particular—was unraveling.39 However true this 
assertion may be, the failure of the Brive rally suggests otherwise. In towns similar in size to his 
native Saint-Céré, Poujade’s speeches attracted a class of shopkeepers disenchanted with- and 
disaffected by the Fourth Republic’s rapid modernization; places like Brive or Tulle (which 
Poujade visited in early May) were, by contrast, in almost the opposite situation in terms of 
postwar economic developments. Between the end of World War II and 1954 the population of 
Brive increased by 7.7% while the period between 1954 and 1962 saw an 11.4% population 
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increase (2.4% and 3.4% above the French average, respectively).
40
 Saint-Céré, meanwhile, had 
a population that has fluctuated between 3,500 and 4,000 since the 18
th
 century when statistics 
were first kept.
41
 The early UDCA platform addressed almost exclusively a set of issues that 
affected only a particular demographic within the larger economic category of rural France’s 
commerçants.  
Disappointment in Brive did not derail Poujade’s plans as a Corrèze branch of the UDCA 
was established in May; furthermore, the chambers of commerce in larger towns, responding to  
pressure exerted from the countryside, recognized Poujadist economic goals.
42
 Most of southern 
France was incorporated into the movement’s structures by the summer; Île-de-France was now 
the target, “it was time [Paris] finally knew who we were and what we wanted,” wrote the leader; 
July 5 was scheduled as the date when regional representatives of the movement were to descend 
on the French capital. Reporters from Le Figaro, France-Soir, and Paris-Match would call 
Poujade and ask where the meeting would be held; tired of responding with “well, nothing is set 
yet,” he finally replied with “I am a peasant, I don’t know Paris.” To this one reporter then 
suggested that the conference center of Maison de la Mutualité might be the right venue as it 
held 2000 people.   “We had 2000 at Cahors last November!” laughed Poujade. The next 
suggestion was the concert hall of Salle Wagram, which could comfortably hold 6000 attendees; 
it too was deemed too small as “there were 8000 at Rodez.” The reporter then proposed the 
Vélodrome d'Hiver, an indoor racetrack—infamous as the site of France’s biggest roundup of 
Jews in the Second World War—that could accommodate around 20,000 people, “Voilà, ce qu’il 
me faut!” replied Poujade.43 The attendance figures at Cahors and Rodez are not corroborated by 
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either Hoffmann or Borne, but that is of rather minor importance, what matters is that while 
writing his biography two decades later Poujade sought to portray the selection of Vel’ d’Hiv as 
purely incidental or even not entirely his own. In addition to the 1954 meeting, the Poujadists 
would hold two more rallies at the velodrome, one in February, 1955 and one in October, 1957, 
of which the former would attract the most widespread condemnation.  
Was Poujade unaware of Vel’ d’Hiv’s infamous reputation or did he agree to the site 
knowing full well its role in the Holocaust? On July 16 and 17, 1942 over 13,000 Parisian Jews 
and Jewish exiles from Eastern Europe were arrested and brought to the track where they were 
held for a week with almost no food or water and no sanitation. The prisoners were subsequently 
moved to Drancy and other French concentration camps from where in August all but 4,000 
children were sent to Auschwitz.
44
 Operation Spring Breeze, as the action was codenamed, was 
notable not only because it marked the beginning of the Final Solution in occupied France but 
also because its SS orchestrators relied on the active participation of thousands of French police 
officers and the French public which notably included upwards of three hundred young men 
wearing blue shirts and armbands bearing the initials of Jacques Doirot’s Parti populaire 
française (of which Pierre Poujade was briefly a member).  
Earlier in the war, shortly after France’s alliance with Poland necessitated a declaration of 
war against Germany, the velodrome served as an assembly point for interned German nationals, 
most of whom, according to Michael Marrus, were Jewish refugees. Earlier still, in July of 1937, 
the track was the site of a large anti-Semitic demonstration that broke out when Charles Maurras, 
leader and ideological architect of the anti-parliamentary Action française, was released from 
prison to which he had been sent for making death threats directed at Prime Minister Léon Blum. 
In attendance were the future Vichy commissioners-general for Jewish affairs, Xavier Vallat and 
                                                          
44
 Susan Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, (Basic Books: New York, 1993), pp 104-17 
- 43 - 
 
Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, as well as Pétain’s propaganda minister, Philippe Henriot.45 
Though a distinction between French anti-Semitism rooted in Catholicism and nationalism and 
Nazi, racial, anti-Semitism which informed the Holocaust and the Vel’ d’Hiv roundup should be 
drawn, anti-Semitism and the extreme Right cannot easily be separated from the racetrack’s 
identity. The racetrack, however, attracted anti-parliamentary organizations from both extremes 
of the political spectrum: it also served as the venue for the Communist Party’s March 10, 1953 
meeting in commemoration of the death of Joseph Stalin.
46
 Poujade most likely chose the site 
because it was easily the largest indoor venue in postwar Paris. However, he would undoubtedly 
have been aware of the venue’s ignominy as the 1954 UDCA rally took place during a summer 
recess in the trial of Höherer SS-und Polizeiführer Carl Oberg and his adjutant Helmut Knochen, 
the latter being the main orchestrator of the 1942 roundup. 
The July 5, 1954 Poujadist rally at Vel’ d’Hiv was a failure. Of the major Parisian 
newspapers only the Communist L’Humanité noticed the “15,000 shopkeepers and artisans who 
came from all over France to enthusiastically and resolutely reassert their goal of bringing about 
veritable fiscal justice.”47 The issues that Poujade would subsequently claim to have been 
campaigning about -- the string of military defeats in Indochina and governmental instability- 
had a hold on the public’s attention that the UDCA’s anti-fiscal platform could not breach. The 
1951 legislative election had marked the victory of a centrist coalition, the Third Force, which 
emerged in the late 1940s as a means of excluding the Communists, who held a plurality in the 
National Assembly, from cabinet positions. To the left of the Third Force again sat the 
Communists and to the right members of Charles de Gaulle’s Rally of the French People 
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(Rassemblement du peuple français—RPF), the former opposed to republicanism in general as an 
expression of its proclaimed Stalinism, the latter seeking to rewrite the Republic’s constitution 
and establish a presidential system.
48
 With dissolution of the Assembly a constitutional 
impossibility
49
 what resulted was a revolving door of cabinets with the longest governing for 
thirteen months. 
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CHAPTER II—Poujadisme 
 
On New Year’s Eve, 1955 the Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans (CNI) held its final 
pre-election rally at the Salle Wagram, an 8,000 seat concert and events hall located within sight 
of the Arc de Triomphe. Characterized by conservative liberal views, the party was the rightmost 
component of the fragile Third Force coalition. The CNI’s social conservatism sparked conflicts 
with the SFIO on such issues as funding for religious schools while its free market liberalism 
stood in opposition to the interventionism that would characterize the Fourth Republic. A 
representative of one of the three lists grouped together under the CNI banner in the Parisian 
electoral district was delivering a speech when he was interrupted by a cry of “Vive Pétain!” to 
which a man at another end of the ballroom responded with “Vive le Roi!” another still 
exclaimed “Vive Poujade!” Several fights subsequently broke out in the rear of the auditorium. 
Most likely because of their overwhelming numerical advantage, the CNI supporters had no 
problem subduing the men behind the disturbance, one of whom sustained minor injuries after 
being thrown down a set of stairs. Le Figaro characterized the intruders as Poujadists, 
Maurrassians, and perhaps most curiously as members of the Rassemblement national populaire, 
a collaborationist party disestablished in 1944.
1
  
In attendance at the rally was Jacques Isorini, a CNI deputy to the National Assembly 
who in 1951 was one of the founding members of the Association for the Defense of the 
Memory of Marshal Pétain (ADMP) and in the 1960s would go on to defend General Raoul 
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Salan of the Organisation de l’armée secrète, who stood trial for treason.2 With the skirmishes 
over, Isorini took the stage and resumed discussion of the topic that had been interrupted: 
Algeria, soon to become the graveyard of the Fourth Republic. “Misery,” he said, assessing the 
situation in France’s nearby overseas department, “is the chief stimulus of nationalism.”3 Two 
days after the CNI rally, for the fifth time since the Liberation, the French electorate headed to 
the polls to elect a National Assembly.  By then Le Mouvement Poujade was already associated 
with nationalism and the radical right, but had “misery”—which initially brought about the 
shopkeepers’ movement—also been a leading cause of their shift toward what their critics saw as 
fascism?  
 The aims of this chapter are first to provide an account of the development of what I 
choose to refer to as “political Poujadism,” which began shortly after the investiture of the new 
cabinet in the summer of 1954, lasted through 1955 when the simultaneously grandiose and 
substanceless UDCA aim of convening the Estates-General emerged, and culminated in the 
Poujadists’ electoral success in January of 1956. My second aim is to examine the critical 
assessments of the movement including accusations of fascism which began to emerge as 
Poujadism transitioned from being a fiscal protest to a political movement and party. The 
accusations of fascism can be divided into two categories distinguished by their grounds: some 
claimed that the movement was fascist because various individuals in the UDCA had long-
established associations with the French far right while others argued that the political ideology 
and tactics of Poujadism were similar to, or indistinguishable from, fascism. 
 Two months after assuming office, in August, 1954, Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-
France fired what Poujade considered Paris’ first salvo directed at the UDCA. Named after 
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Henry Dorey, an MRP deputy and the National Assembly’s fiscal expert, the Dorey Amendment 
allowed law enforcement to prosecute “anyone who prevented the exercise of government audits 
or participated in a collective action to prevent said operation.”4 With discussions of the 
amendment underway in the Palais Bourbon, Poujade penned an open letter to all the deputies 
and senators wherein he accused them of betraying France by being unwilling to engage in any 
dialogue with the growing fiscal revolt. Justifications for the law and a broader fiscal overhaul 
promised by Mendès-France such as “national productivity and international productivity,” were 
to Poujade empty phrases used by government figures to conceal the “materialism and 
inhumanity” that in reality motivated their actions. The amendment, Poujade argued, was a threat 
to the solidarity of France and to its cohesiveness as a nation, not just to the livelihood of a few 
commerçants whose arrests would serve to augment the movement’s martyrology.5 After 
deliberations regarding the amendment began in July, all votes regarding its language and final 
passage would see all 103 Communist deputies consistently abstain in order to echo their 
solidarity with the shopkeepers and artisans of France.
6
 Communist resistance was, however, 
more a protest than a real attempt to affect policy as passage of the bill was a foregone 
conclusion and it was adopted on August 15, passing by a comfortable margin of 366 to 116.  
 While Poujadism in its first year of existence saw as its goal the general betterment of the 
social and economic conditions of the self-employed middle class, the investiture of the Mendès-
France government and passage of the Dorey Amendment provided a stimulus for the UDCA’s 
transformation into a movement of organized political opposition. In early November of 1954 
several hundred regional deputies travelled to Algiers to attend the first national congress of the 
                                                          
4
 Le Monde, August 16, 1954 
5
 Pierre Poujade, “Lettre ouverte à MM. les Députés et Sénateurs,” in J’ai choisi le combat, (Société Générale des 
Éditions et Publications: Sait-Céré, 1955), pp. 248-9 
6
 Le Monde, July 8, 1954 
- 49 - 
 
shopkeepers’ and artisans’ organization. It is entirely unclear why the Algerian city was selected 
as the site of the meeting (Dominic Borne speculates in jest that Poujade simply wanted to visit 
his in-laws).
7
 Poujadist rallies and meetings had a tendency to coincide with- and be obscured by 
events of much greater importance, and the Algiers congress was no exception:  the Algerian 
War is often seen as commencing on November 1, 1954 or “Red All-Saints’ Day.”8 UDCA 
representatives most likely arrived in Algeria in the first week of November, a week which began 
with an extraordinary session of the General Council of the Department of Algiers which 
unanimously ordered that “the guilty, whoever they are, be exemplarily punished.” What ensued 
was a wave of random arrests and police reprisals against the Muslim population which Alistair 
Horne in his historic classic, Savage War of Peace, saw as evocative of Claude Rains’ “Round 
up the usual suspects!” at the end of Casablanca and, more significantly, of a pattern of French 
and British brutal treatment of outbreaks of colonial nationalism.
9
  The unrest was not limited to 
the North African colony; in Paris, despite declaring Algeria “irrevocably French,” Mendès-
France and his minister of the Interior, François Mitterrand -- who proclaimed that “the only 
possible negotiation is war” -- avoided a no-confidence decision by 29 votes.10  
Regardless of the tumult around them, the Poujadists gathering in Algiers focused on a 
set of rather quotidian matters. A year earlier, in Cahors, when the UDCA was constituted and 
Poujade declared its leader, the new president’s first decision was to create L’Union, the 
movement’s newspaper. Because the paper’s sales were dismal, questions about Poujade’s 
                                                          
7
 Bourne, Petits Bourgeois en Revolte, p. 90-1. Dates of the Algiers congress are difficult to estimate as neither 
Poujade nor his earliest historical analysis conducted by Stanley Hoffmann offer no precise date but rather mention 
only “November.” Based on articles in Le Monde (Nov. 11, 1954), however, this paper sees it as opening on 
November 7.  
8
 Indeed, four years later Poujade would author a supplement to Fraternité Française, entitled “Poujade Told You 
So…” wherein he suggested that the UDCA congress was the birthplace of the concept and rallying cry of “Algérie 
française.”   
9
 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace, (Penguin Books: New York, 1977), pp. 83-104 
10
 Ibid. 
- 50 - 
 
appropriation of finances—and more generally about his leadership—were raised at a “pre-
congress” in Saint-Céré and persisted in Algiers.11 A group of “renegades from Limoges” 
prepared a declaration, provocatively entitled “J’accuse,” which criticized the UDCA president’s 
wrongdoings, but before it could be presented, Poujade denounced his critics as subjects of 
manipulation and financial corruption by outside political parties.
12
 With the internal opposition 
expelled, the Algiers congress approved additional funding for a newspaper and began the 
printing of Fraternité Française, subtitled “La Tribune de Pierre Poujade.” While analyzing the 
importance of the newspaper, Borne argues that its publication was integral to the growth of Le 
Mouvement Poujade beyond the circles of disaffected shopkeepers as evidenced by the paper’s 
frequent overtures to peasants, intellectuals, and the French public at large.
13
 The newspaper’s 
first issue was published in January, 1955 and contained a series of appeals made by Poujade to 
different elements of France’s society, each stressing that insofar as the shopkeeper and the 
artisan represented the collective interests of the Nation (“nous—les commerçants et artisans—
sommes le carrefour de la nation”), their struggle was also the struggle of all other walks of 
life.
14
 “People of France,” concludes the address to intellectuals, “our country has a place for 
everyone but we must first bring order to our home, our interests are the same, we must be 
mutually understanding and united.” In addition to the expansion of the Poujadist print 
publication, the Algiers conference also decided upon some far-reaching changes in policy: most 
notably, a radical shift in attitude vis-à-vis organized labor as well as the French Communist 
Party.  
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It was the UDCA’s newfound animosity towards labor unions that gave rise to the first 
accusations of fascism leveled against the organization. On March 23, 1955, Robert Bothereau, 
general secretary of Confédération Générale du Travail - Force Ouvrière (General 
Confederation of Labor - Workers’ Force—FO) addressed representatives of the American press 
community. The FO was founded in 1947 when Bothereau, dissatisfied with the level of direct 
PCF control over France’s organized labor organizations, created a non-Communist alternative, 
allegedly receiving substantial CIA financial support to do so.
15
 Bothereau insisted that the 
measures campaigned for by the Poujadists, specifically their calls for major changes to the tax 
code, could not be implemented unilaterally. Presumably because he expected France’s national 
expenditures to not decrease at the same rates as taxation, the FO leader stated that any cuts in 
taxes affecting business owners would inevitably result in increased taxation of employees. 
Bothereau therefore insisted that his organization “had to take a strong stance against le 
Mouvement Poujade.” This “strong stance” involved the declaration that, “we [the FO] worry 
about some of [the movement’s] clearly fascist aspects—its glorification of the leader, its 
methods of direct action, etc.—but we believe that these characteristics originate from 
[Poujade’s] staff, Poujade himself is too frightened by his own success.”16 Bothereau’s 
assessment of the fascistic inclinations of the Poujadists provides a useful framework for the 
analysis of other left-wing criticisms of the movement. Affiliation with known members of 
established political entities of both the right and the left, political campaign methods, as well as 
ideological concerns shall be examined separately to determine the basis for early criticism of 
Poujade and the UDCA.  
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When Bothereau argued that the “clearly fascist aspects” of Poujadism originated among 
the UDCA’s high-ranking members, he would have most likely been referring to figures such as 
“the green führer,” Henri Dorgères. In the 1930s, Dorgères’ Défense Paysanne was a notable 
feature of the French political landscape as it transcended the role of a rural pressure group and 
engaged in bona fide political action supported by a private militia clad in green shirts. Though 
the agricultural demographic disaffected by the Great Depression from which the organization 
drew its support was different than that of the rural middle class of the UDCA, its marches 
promising to “clean out the Parisian nest of bureaucrats” would go on to be echoed by the 
rallying cry of “sortez les sortants” that Poujade would adopt in the months preceding the 
legislative election.
17
 Even if cooperation between Dorgères and Poujade would culminate in the 
election of the former to the National Assembly on a Poujadist ticket, it is crucial to note that—
especially in the first few months after the Algiers congress—the relationship between the two 
was rather tenuous. In the 1950s Dorgères attempted to rebuild his prewar organization and by 
1956 the reconstituted Défense Paysanne claimed 75,000 members. When in Fraternité 
Française Poujade called on the peasants of France to support his movement “before it was too 
late” and when he framed the decision between supporting the UDCA and not doing so as a 
choice between freedom and slavery, he was in fact competing for supporters directly with 
Dorgères.
18
 If the relationship between Dorgères and Poujade can be labeled as one of political 
exploitation, it was Poujade who reaped the benefits as the alliance with the Défense Paysanne 
allowed his UDCA to expand into the historically right-leaning regions along the lower Loire.
19
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Equally worthy of consideration as the UDCA’s association with established members of 
the radical right is the evident Communist sympathy and support the movement received in its 
first two years. Whereas support by right wing figures could, and did, persist, communist support 
would have to disintegrate dramatically before the majority of fascism accusations could be 
leveled. As the election of 1956 approached, the major political parties made their final overtures 
to the French voters. Published in Le Figaro, the CNI’s final appeal was critical of both the 
Socialists and Radicals, chastising Mendès-France’s for his inadequate fervor in denouncing the 
possibility of including Communists in the cabinet. CNI criticism of the Poujadists, though not 
pervasive, was rooted in a similar concern: its “indirect cooperation with muscovite 
candidates.”20 Cooperation between Poujade and the Communists is well documented. Hoffmann 
credits the Communist L’Humanité with being the first nationally-circulated newspaper to take a 
keen interest in the anti-tax protest staged by the Poujadists in early 1954;
21
 a look at the 
electoral map of France’s southwest can help explain why this was the case. In the legislative 
election of 1951 there were only two departments where the fragmented non-Gaullist right 
obtained an absolute majority of the vote: Aveyron and Cantal—the latter also being the only 
department south of the Loire to favor the right continually since the proclamation of the Third 
Republic in 1870.
22
 Together with Corrèze and Lot, these departments constituted the four initial 
“conquests” of the Poujadists. The voters of Lot were split virtually evenly among all the 
political parties, though a rightward inclination was noticeable and can be traced back to before 
the First World War.
23
 Corrèze, meanwhile, was one of only five French departments where the 
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PCF received over a third of the vote; indeed, in Corrèze the Communists virtually controlled the 
leftist vote with the SFIO receiving fewer than 5%.
24
  
Because of its appeal on the basis of economic hardship to a population disillusioned with 
the government, the Poujadists could challenge the Communists’ hegemony on the radical left of 
the political spectrum. Considering that early Poujadist rhetoric was generally apolitical and 
hence not directly antagonistic to the doctrine of the Communist Party, the latter sought to 
support the shopkeepers’ movement so as to steer it in a direction that would not threaten its 
electoral interests. This in turn helps explain the large number of known former and active 
Communists within the ranks of the early UDCA.
25
 
Second on Bothereau’s list of concerns were “direct action methods” employed by the 
Poujadists. The meaning of the generic concept of direct action is difficult to pin down as it 
encapsulates anything from marches, strikes, and civil disobedience to rioting, street fights, and 
other forms of political violence. If the broadest definition available is adopted, one could accuse 
Bothereau of a degree of hypocrisy as not only did his early syndicalist predecessors rely on 
violence, but more importantly, organized strikes provide perhaps the most basic form of trade 
union pressure. Bothereau, however, was most likely alluding only to the violent end of the 
spectrum as it encompasses the sorts of “activism” generally associated with the rise of Nazism 
and Fascism in the 1920s and 30s. Contemporary critics often echo this theme of 1950s criticism 
and find evidence of Poujadist “fascistic tendencies” of direct action in the tactics of Jean-Marie 
Le Pen whose youth wing of the UDCA would often disrupt opponents’ political engagements. 
In his study of French electoral politics Philip Williams describes how Le Pen and his “rowdies,” 
mostly university students, would attend rallies organized by opponents across the political 
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spectrum and “drowned out the speakers’ voices with shouts—or by cowbells, drums, 
loudspeakers, hunting horns, and alarm clocks, [while] elsewhere speakers were bombarded 
eggs, fruits and vegetables, and even cream cakes.”26 Though he notes that, at worst, Poujadist 
activists would cut lighting cords and instruct electricians not to install faulty sound systems, 
Williams is careful to note that such tactics were reminiscent more of audacious student pranks 
than of interwar Brown- or Black Shirt tactics.
27
 Just as it is imperative to echo Williams’ 
sentiments when evaluating criticisms of Poujade from a 21
st
 century perspective, it is 
worthwhile to consider how such tactics would have looked from the point of view of someone 
who did not possess the benefit of knowing that the UDCA was less than two years from fading 
into obscurity. Indeed, the lack of coverage Poujade and his movement’s exploits in newspapers 
of the time provides a reason explaining why it would have been easy for critics to antagonize 
the UDCA or see it as potentially threatening.  
On January 5, 1956, two days after the legislative election, Le Monde’s Alain Murcier 
asked “Qui est M[onsieur] Pierre Poujade?” In the article that follows, Murcier provided readers 
with a brief biography of the UDCA leader and a paragraph devoted to how the “young, 
eloquent, and dynamic” stationer from Lot came to lead a program of militant shopkeepers into 
the National Assembly.
28
 Similarly, Le Figaro, introduced Poujade and his movement to its 
readers only after their electoral success was secure.
29
 The fact that Poujadism had to be 
introduced to the national audience when 51 UFF deputies were already on their way to Paris 
suggests that accounts of their previous activity received almost no attention. As I have 
submitted in discussions of the first Vel’ d’Hiv rally and the Algiers congress of the UDCA, this 
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lack of media coverage may to a degree be attributed to a series of concurrent but entirely 
unrelated events that tended to overshadow Poujadist rallies. For example, when representatives 
of the shopkeepers’ movement returned to Vel’ d’Hiv on February 15, their rally was once again 
overshadowed by the drama in Palais Bourbon as for the better part of two weeks the front pages 
of the major dailies announced the cabinet to be put up for the Assembly’s approval that day.30 
Nor did international developments help the UDCA’s efforts to secure the French public’s 
attention: tensions in the straits of Taiwan and the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu gave rise to 
American Cold War brinksmanship and provided yet another subject to relegate brief stories of 
the rally to back pages. Poujade spent much of his two hour speech at Vel’ d’Hiv discussing 
what he saw as deliberate media neglect of UDCA rallies. All representatives of newspapers and 
radio in attendance were invited to take the stage to see the 20,000 Parisian shopkeepers who 
made their way to the racetrack so that “they could have no excuse to claim only 7,000 people 
had come.” “When you, the journalists,” Poujade addressed his co-occupants of the stage, 
“announce all across your front pages that little Prince Charles peed next to his pot, we are all 
greatly interested; we would, however, appreciate it if your accounts of our protests were not 
confined to twenty five lines next to the obituaries.”31 
Poujade’s claims that the nation’s papers refused to print stories attesting to the 
movement’s high levels of popularity were most likely made in reference to the coverage of a 
120,000-man-strong march that the UDCA held in southern Paris three weeks earlier (on January 
25, 1955). In this instance, stories of the march were brief—if at all printed—as the event 
coincided with a flood of the French capital. As a photograph included in Poujade’s J’ai choisi le 
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combat suggests, members of the Union de défense des commerçants et artisans came to Paris to 
defend the interests of shopkeepers but wound up physically defending their property from 
floodwaters while posing with copies of Fraternité française.
32
 The Paris rally may not have met 
Poujade’s expectations as the event that would give the movement national exposure, it did, 
however serve to provide some further glimpses of the “direct action” and “glorification of the 
leader” alluded to by Bothereau.  
The theme of a direct, uncompromising approach to politics is evident not just in the fact 
that the Poujadist held a large-scale protest to voice their demands, but also in that the only 
tangible piece of UDCA policy relating to the march is a January 21 survey authored by Poujade. 
The document, sent out to all members of the Senate and the National Assembly, was an eight 
point questionnaire asking the deputies whether they supported or opposed individual points of 
the Gramat platform modified to include as its first issue the immediate repeal of the Dorey 
amendment, and as its last full amnesty of anyone punished by the law.
33
 The aim of this  
strategy was chiefly to force Socialists and Radicals to either respond “no” to some points or 
refuse to respond altogether in order to discredit them in the eyes of UDCA members in 
attendance at the rally.
34
 After the crowd jeered the results of the parliamentary survey, Pierre 
Poujade took the stage.  
A round of roaring applause filled the convention center of Parc des expositions near the 
Porte de Versailles metro station. After a rendition of La Marseillaise, the “black haired, bright 
eyed young man with broad shoulders,” as Le Monde characterized Poujade, began his oration. 
Though the speech commenced with an anti-fiscal tirade about statisticians with brains 
overflowing with numbers, it quickly transitioned to tender evocations of the “wives and mothers 
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of France who ensure the sustainability of the country.” Feeding off the crowd’s enthusiasm, 
Poujade proceeded to describe an ideal France, a country where “artisans and shopkeepers thrive 
in the shade of the Tree of Liberty.”35 Standing under a large banner reading “Union de défense 
des commerçants et artisans / movement de Saint-Céré / Pierre Poujade” with the words “Pierre 
Poujade” in a serifed font twice the size of the first two lines, Poujade’s speech lasted for over an 
hour and a half. On all posters or banners, in addition to the coq gaulois, Poujade’s name was 
virtually omnipresent, thus giving rise to accusations of a degree of leadership worship. This 
supposed personality cult might best be explained with the notion of stardom as developed by 
John Gaffney and Diana Holmes in their Stardom in Postwar France.  
As an advanced capitalist society, France, the authors argue, was in the 1950s and 60s a 
society conducive to the emergence of a star system that existed outside the world of the arts as 
evidenced in academics such as Lévi-Strauss and Sartre who enjoyed celebrity status. This 
development was in large part driven by the same socioeconomic characteristics of life in 
postwar France that influenced the rise of Poujadism: modernization, profound political division, 
the continued juxtaposition of economic prosperity and colonial decline, as well as the need to 
rectify the differences between visions of peacetime society with memories of military horror as 
experienced either in the Second World War, Indochina, or Algeria. Because it creates 
archetypes, Gaffney and Holmes write, “a star system helps a society reconcile or appear to 
reconcile contradictions” such as those listed above.36 Using the example of Charles de Gaulle, 
Gaffney proceeds to propose the concept of political stardom founded not only on ideas of 
celebrity status but also on the “singular nature” and “preoccupation with the personalization of 
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leadership” inherently characteristic of French political culture.37 While comparisons of de 
Gaulle and Poujade shall not delay us here, it is worth noting that political stardom may provide 
an explanation of the latter’s popularity and the UDCA’s allegedly authoritarian party structure. 
Le Monde noted that at the January 25 rally, in addition to criticism of France’s fiscal 
system, Poujade made repeated, personal attacks on Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France. In the 
fall of 1954, Mendès-France launched a dual campaign to curb rates of alcoholism. Its first 
component was an increase in the rate of taxation that owners of bars or bistrots/bistros, and 
small-scale bottlers of wine and liquor were liable to pay. Second was a public relations effort 
whereby the Prime Minister would walk the proverbial walk and opted to drink milk at state 
functions and in the chamber of the national assembly. On the fiscal front, the campaign served 
to further increase Poujade’s base of supporters as home distillers, bouilleurs de cru, began to 
join the ranks of the UDCA in large numbers. It was the campaign of drinking milk, however, 
which would attract noteworthy opposition from Poujade as well as lighthearted derision from Le 
Figaro’s cartoonist, Jean Sennep, who depicted the newly-appointed President of the Assembly 
and third generation wine-maker, Pierre Schneiter, as a personified bottle of champagne glaring 
menacingly at a glass of milk in the middle benches occupied by Mendès-France’s Radicals.38  
Personal attacks on Mendès-France serve as the best-documented expressions of 
Poujade’s thinly veiled anti-Semitism. Following the UDCA’s 1955 Paris rally, Le Monde 
published an anthology of derisive and in some cases anti-Semitic excerpts from Poujade’s 
addresses. “Our fathers who would go to bistros, they are the ones who secured victory at 
Verdun; and Mendès? He wasn’t even there!” “The corner bar,” he continued, “is the victim of 
the anti-alcoholic frenzy of the government and of its head, ‘Mendès-Lolo,’” generally translated 
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as “Milky Mendès.”39 The “France” in Mendès-France was often a target of Poujade’s mockery 
as he deemed it to be a facetiously patriotic attempt at establishing national belonging. Mendès-
France was indeed the descendant of an immigrant family of Sephardic Jews, his ancestors, 
however, had migrated to France from Portugal in the 16
th
 century, meaning that their relocation 
predated that of Poujade’s Spanish ancestors by about three hundred years. Poujade’s next gush 
of vitriol was directed at Henri Ulver, the Jewish Minister of Industry and Commerce: “Mr. 
Ulver, who was parachuted into the cabinet, was only a second generation Frenchman, his 
parents were scratching off fleas on the banks of the Danube.”40 
The very fact that Le Monde chose to publish these generally unrefined statements 
without any commentary suggests that, at least among its moderately left-leaning readership, 
these would have been considered offensive, meaning that there were certain groups in France 
for whom anti-Semitism was worthy of criticism. On the other hand, it should be noted that in 
the right wing Le Figaro, cartoons of Mendès-France and their emphasis of the Prime Minister’s 
facial features would today be widely viewed as generally offensive and perhaps racist.
41
 Many 
historians point to Poujade’s anti-Semitism in their discussions of his potential belonging to the 
lineage of the French far right or even fascism.
42
 The relationship between Poujade’s comments 
and fascism is a complex one and the connection is arguably impossible to make. Anti-Semitism 
is not generally regarded as a requisite trait of fascism while in the 1950s it perhaps would not 
have even been considered an integral aspect of Nazism. In Fascism and Neofascism, Angelica 
Fenner and Eric Weitz write that, until the aftermath of Adolf Eichmann’s 1961 trial in 
Jerusalem, the Holocaust played only a minor role in understanding National Socialism and the 
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extermination of Jews was deemed but one of many of Adolf Hitler’s crimes against humanity.43 
The almost simultaneous publication of Raul Hilberg’s Destruction of the European Jew which 
famously saw the Holocaust as “the culmination of a cyclical trend” of persecution that the Nazi 
regime certainly completed but did not initiate, put the Final Solution into a political context 
which allowed it to exist independently of Hitler’s personal fanaticism.44  
At the time of Poujade’s political activity, the most frequent charge brought up in relation 
to his anti-Semitism was one of racism. Charges of racially-driven anti-Semitism may lead one 
to make the connection to German Nazism as Robert Paxton describes the anti-Semitism that 
characterized Vichy policy as one rooted in staunch Catholicism and nationalism as opposed to a 
level of perceived racial superiority.
45
 This, however, does not mean that Poujade was accused of 
Nazi anti-Semitism. Racial theories can be found in the writings of the anti-Dreyfusard right 
including in one of its ideological sources, Edouard Drumont’s La France Juive which 
differentiates the “chivalrous, disinterested, frank and trusting to the point of naivety” Aryan 
from the “scheming, subtle and cunning” Semite.46 In comparison, it becomes immediately 
evident that Poujade’s anti-Semitic comments, though sometimes vulgar, did not come close to 
the vitriol of earlier French anti-Semites. To Poujade, charges of racism, and the propagation of 
“isms” in general, were an example of “the biggest moral swindle France has ever known.” He 
then outlined the logic behind accusations he had heard leveled against him: 
You believe in having a basic responsibility to the nation? Fascist! You care deeply about 
the fate of those weaker and less fortunate than yourself, as any righteous man—and 
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especially a Frenchman—ought to do? Communist! You claim to be the master in your 
own home? Racist!
47
 
Poujade’s defense against allegations of anti-Semitism and racism does not delve any further into 
what he perceived to be the logical flaws of his opponents’ arguments, but he instead points to 
the fact that an israëlite named Kauffman was one of the most senior members of the UDCA and 
served as its regional president in Bas-Rhin.
48
 While Poujade’s defense is not highly convincing, 
ascribing Poujade’s criticism of Mendès-France solely to Poujade’s anti-Semitism overlooks the 
classical liberalism and perhaps even anti-statism that underlay Poujade’s opposition to the anti-
alcohol campaign as the UDCA president often supported his comments by arguing that the 
government should not concern itself with the health of France’s citizens and of their children.49 
If general criticism and accusations of fascism were few and far between through the first 
half of 1955, their volume and ferocity increased gradually throughout the fall as the elections 
approached. Here, Poujadist tactics and ideology were once again to blame. In early June, the 
UDCA convened in Saint-Céré for a party congress Stanley Hoffmann describes as rivaling in 
importance the meeting in Algiers in the preceding autumn. It was in Saint-Céré that the vague 
rhetoric of fraternité française became a political goal: Unions de défense parallel in structure 
and motivation to that of the UDCA were to be established among other professions of the lower 
and middle class in order to prepare France for the convocation of the Estates-General.
50
 The 
Estates-General of the Poujadist platform would have held as its aim the creation of an economic 
program that would “enrich the people; boost industrial production; liberate commerce; open a 
market outlet for agricultural goods” but also “remake of France an independent world power 
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and strengthen the French Union; ensure a prosperous future for France’s youth; return to us our 
freedom.”51 In short, it was to accomplish something positive for everyone and hence the Estates 
General became the centerpiece (if not the entirety) of the movement’s electoral platform. 
Attempting to synthesize a coherent political ideology out of Poujade’s conception of the 
Estates-General is a difficult task that produces highly contradictory results. Because the French 
political system as the Poujadists saw it was rife with “individualistic egoism” and did not 
adequately represent the “particular interests of France’s society,” the Estates-General of 1956 
would have circumvented—if not toppled—the parliamentary arrangement of the Fourth 
Republic.
52
 Considering that French society was not formally divided into estates as was the case 
in 1789 when the body last convened, and because the stated goal behind the UDCA’s Estates 
General was to unify French society, not to divide it,
53
 Poujade’s project would have resembled 
its revolutionary predecessor in name only. Furthermore, there exists no stated practical outline 
for the formation of the council although it may be speculated that the regional, occupation-
specific Unions de défense were meant to later elect representatives to the national meeting of 
the Estates General. The project’s lack of substance or even impossibility were not a major issue 
to the majority of Poujadists as allusions to “États Généraux” appear on almost every one of 
their campaign posters.
54
 It is also in these posters that further reasons for criticism of the 
movement can be found. 
“If you are satisfied with your elected representatives; if you have resigned yourself to 
living in a decadent society, stay home,” opens a poster promoting the “Parliamentary List of 
Union et Fraternité Française presented by Pierre Poujade.” “However, if you do not accept 
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France’s decline, if you oppose fiscal tyranny and the exploitation of man by his fellow man, 
wake up! […] Like you, we want justice: fiscal justice for taxpayers, social justice for workers, 
and military justice for traitors.” Besides “justice” and the Estates General, the poster notes 
nothing that the movement is supportive of, only a list of entities it is committed to fighting such 
as “vagabond financial trusts” and “electoral swindles.”55 Another poster includes in the center a 
picture of a smiling Poujade below a large heading of “Warning! This man is dangerous.” The 
electoral advertisement then proceeds to explain how Poujade is a threat to the left because he 
“opposes the exploitation of human misery for political ends,” to the center because he “opposes 
the destruction of the French empire and seeks to combat the mismanagement and treason that 
caused it,” and to the right because “he forcefully attacks stateless trusts and financial 
organizations.”56 In embracing opposition to parties across the political spectrum and adopting 
the image of someone dangerous to the political establishment at large, Poujade, who did not 
seek election to the National Assembly, provided his political opponents with printed evidence of 
what could be interpreted as anti-parliamentarism or anti-republicanism. Combined with the 
overall vagueness of the Estates-General project, Poujade’s anti everything image would have 
allowed his critics to project onto his person and his movement any meaning or ideological 
stance that, while it could have never been provable, would have likewise not have been 
deniable. 
As elections neared, profound divisions within le Mouvement Poujade began to emerge. 
In an open letter, Francis Bos, whom we have already encountered as the founder of the UDCA 
branch in Cantal, after resigning his vice-presidency of the movement, accused the Estates-
General project’s aim of fostering national unity in all aspects of life of being “absolutely 
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incompatible with [the UDCA’s] means and possibilities.”57 Similarly, UDCA committees in 
Brive and Tulle voted almost unanimously to distance themselves from the national bureau over 
its insistence on pursuing the project’s realization as they deemed “too adventurous and 
political” as well as a threat to the basic integrity of the Union. After the 138-6 vote, Monsieur 
Quincy, a representative of the central committee of the UDCA was expelled from the hall “not 
without having been somewhat abused.”58  
The results of the January, 1956 election help confirm that the Mouvement Poujade that 
secured close to 12% of the national vote was radically different than that which sought to 
protect the interests of the disaffected rural middle class beginning in 1953. Areas where the UFF 
received over 15 percent of the vote were limited to an east-west band between Marseille and 
Toulouse and the area between Laval and La Rochelle in the northwest. The latter corresponds to 
an area highly supportive of de Gaulle’s RPF in the 1951 election. The southern band 
meanwhile, with the exception of Vaucluse, was an area of longstanding support of the left.  In 
his native Lot, Poujade’s party received around 8 percent of the vote, meanwhile in Corrèze the 
percentage was closer to 5.
59
 In the immediate aftermath of the January 2 election, the loudest 
voices of criticism originated beyond France’s borders. Due to preexisting Cold War attitudes, 
the American press generally expressed anger at the success of the PCF which together with the 
Poujadists constituted a “French SNAFU,” a concept which the foreign press review section of 
Le Figaro had the awkward task of explaining.
60
 While in Moscow Pravda hailed the success of 
Maurice Thorez’s PCF, the Western European press voiced serious concern about the Poujadists’ 
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far right characteristics.
61
 Summing up the elections, London’s The Times noted that the parties 
of the two extremes which together accounted for nearly forty percent of the vote ‘would destroy 
parliamentary institutions;’ if the Poujadists followed through on their electoral promises the 
article argued, France was to become a political vacuum which ‘a force unworthy of the Fourth 
Republic’ could fill.62 This force, according to The Daily Mail, would not be dissimilar from that 
once headed by ‘a little house painter from Austria,’ the Labour Party’s Daily Herald expounded 
on this dismal prognosis by suggesting that Poujade might well turn the National Assembly into 
a beer garden.
63
 It was also around this time that a cartoon depicting Adolf Hitler and his 
supposed ideological descendant, “Poujadolf” was published in the Daily Mirror before being 
translated and reprinted in Paris-Match. Though foreign observers are equipped with a level of 
distance conducive to objectivity, it is also true that coverage of the development of Poujadism 
was so sparse in the American press that the UFF’s electoral success would have seemed to have 
developed almost overnight. However rapid, the rise of the UDCA/UFF was far from 
instantaneous. Poujade’s appearance on a March cover of Time magazine and the accompanying 
multi-page feature that was far more complimentary than disparaging suggest that, given time 
and exposure, to an objective foreign audience Poujade became far less threatening than his 
Communist adversaries portrayed him to be at that very time.
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A recent development in the field of history is attention to the concept of collective memory. As 
an approach to history, memory emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War as the 
European intellectual community sought to understand how the recent experiences of the war 
and of the Holocaust shaped the collective identity of Europe and the identities of its various 
national components. The concept of historical memory has its roots in the inherently 
postmodern and poststructuralist theory of social constructionism as Małgorzata Pakier and Bo 
Stråth report the widespread acceptance of the notion “that the writing of history is less a matter 
of the unproblematic discovery of a past ‘out there’ by means of refined techniques of source 
criticism and is more something dependent upon the context of the present in which questions 
about the past emerge.”1 Unlike individual memory, the authors contend, collective memory is 
an intrinsically discursive construction.
2
 Collective memory is a useful tool in historical analysis 
for the very reason that it is constructed, at times deliberately. Inaccuracies in representation thus 
become not simple errors but expressions of a desired alternate reality. In the remainder of this 
paper I will consider how the constructed and politicized memory of war and the Resistance 
influenced the way in which the French of the 1950s understood Poujadism and how they 
categorized it.   
 Henry Rousso’s acclaimed Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944, 
utilizes an “event-oriented” approach to assess the prevalence and trace the development of 
politicized memories of occupation and Resistance across almost half a century of French 
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history. Rousso’s analysis subdivides the period between liberation and the book’s 1987 
publication into four distinctive phases and employs movies, official celebrations, and scholarly 
publications as tools for distilling the national memory he is after. Memories of the Vichy 
regime’s acts and influence, argues Rousso, have proven time and again to “[play] an essential if 
not primary role in the difficulties that the people of France have faced in reconciling themselves 
to their history.”3 The deep divisions that characterized French society from the Dreyfus Affair 
through to the Popular Front era persisted through the war and well into the second half of the 
20
th
 century; furthermore, Rousso contends, threats to reignite the guerre franco-française 
informed the politics of memory with regard to Vichy.
4
 While Rousso’s somewhat contradictory 
conclusion which declares that deeper social and political structures did not disintegrate as a 
result of “the Vichy crisis” somewhat undermines his earlier claims of profound political 
division, the work is generally held in high regard and cited almost ubiquitously.
5
 An inseparable 
element of the Vichy Syndrome is what Rousso refers to as résistancialisme, or the 
Resistancialist Myth which held as a “quasi-sacred symbol” the clandestine struggle of the 
French nation in the years separating the debacle of June, 1940 and liberation.
6
  
Résistancialisme is not the tangible legacy of the Resistance that was manifest in the 
relative political accord of the first few years after liberation, but rather its politicized collective 
memory; although it is a deliberately constructed collective memory, it is important to remember 
that the Resistancialist Myth’s origins are in a real struggle of the French to fight either the Nazi 
occupier, the Vichy state, or both. Though members of the Resistance shared an enemy, it was 
                                                          
3
 Rousso, Vichy Syndrome, p. 9 
4
 Ibid., e.g. p. 205, 251, events that threaten to ratchet up tensions in French society include the trial of Klaus Barbie 
as well as the increased academic output of works related to the Vichy period in the 1970s.  
5Bertram M. Gordon “The ‘Vichy Syndrome’ Problem in History,” French Historical Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 
(Autumn, 1995) , pp. 495-518 
6
 Rousso outlines this idea early in the book (p. 8, 9, pp. 18-19) and then traces its influence on the political life of 
France in the following years. 
- 70 - 
 
far from a united movement, the divisions that characterized Popular Front era France persisted 
in wartime. The Communist party, well trained in clandestine tactics and underground means of 
existence, was one of the first major sources of opposition. Perhaps the single biggest reason for 
the emergence of Communist Resistance was Hitler’s decision to launch Operation Barbarossa. 
Until the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union commenced in June of 1941, the French Communist 
Party found itself in the precarious position of attempting to reconcile its well-established anti-
fascism with the recent fact of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the subsequent joint invasion of 
Poland.
7
 In wartime, PCF resistance tended to tone down its partisan rhetoric so as to not alienate 
elements of local populations, the decentralized nature of irregular combat was instead 
emphasized as the name “Francs-Tireurs” was chosen to describe Communist resistance groups, 
invoking the defense of France in the Franco-Prussian War.
8
 While this highlighting of the 
Resistance’s transcendence of party politics was perhaps motivated by pragmatic goals of 
securing broad support, Kedward demonstrates that there did in fact emerge a genuine Resistance 
mindset. This Resistance esprit was characterized by a level of “left-wing humanism” 
characterized by the defense of “human values threatened with extinction by the unacceptable 
forces of darkness.”9  
In the French capital, as the Allied armies neared in the summer of 1944, a general strike 
and police revolt (with the town increasingly abandoned by German forces) transformed into an 
armed uprising. Barricades were erected and street combat flared up in the few days before 
Generals de Gaulle and Leclerc received Eisenhower’s approval for the 2nd Armored Division’s 
detour from the road to Berlin in order to liberate the city.
10
 With the French tricolore raised atop 
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the Eiffel tower, de Gaulle entered the city on August 25 and at the Hôtel de Ville delivered the 
second of his two famous wartime speeches, The Resistance Myth is generally traced this 
speech: 
Paris! Paris humiliated! Paris broken! Paris martyrized! But Paris liberated! Liberated by 
itself, by its own people with the help of the armies of France, with the support and aid of 
France as a whole, of fighting France, of the only France, of the true France, of eternal 
France.
11
  
Even the most superficial analysis of the 1944 campaign to liberate France will immediately lead 
one to conclude that this account is far from factually correct as France’s “dear and admirable 
allies” did much more than play a supportive role in liberation. Originating in the speech, 
résistancialisme refabricates the memory of the Resistance in two distinct ways. First, it attempts 
to create an inherently militaristic ideal type of résistant where one cannot be historically 
demonstrated. The proposition that one could take up resistance through organizations other than 
those loyal to the government-in-exile or the PCF is virtually disqualified.
12
 Even though distinct 
political ideologies persisted in wartime, the mythical Resistance was one of profound unity.  
Second, the Resistance Myth retroactively ascribes to all of France a level of support for 
the minority position that was open struggle against the Nazi occupier, thus attempting to secure 
the political unity of the nation. Notions strikingly similar to de Gaulle’s assertion of France’s 
liberation “with the support and the help of all France” can be found in a series of Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s essays in Combat, one of the literary organs of the Resistance.13  Detailing the Parisian 
revolt of mid-August, these articles provide, for example, accounts of street combat after crowds 
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decided to take fate into their own hands as “[t]he road that leads from painful docility to 
insurrection has finally been run.” An even more forceful affirmation of the French public’s 
collective role in the liberation of their country can be found in Sartre’s description of the 
wartime France, La République du Silence which concludes that “[t]his Republic without 
institutions, without an army, without police, was something that at each instant every 
Frenchman had to win and to affirm against Nazism. No one failed in this duty, and now we are 
on the threshold of another Republic.”14  
Factors explaining the popularity of the glorified image of the Resistance are many and 
vary according to the different political elements utilizing it. Across the political spectrum, 
references to wartime resistance were generally motivated by a desire to wipe the slate clean and 
construct postwar society in a way that would rectify the wrongs of the interwar period; the slate, 
writes Tony Judt, would only be truly wiped clean in Central and Eastern Europe where Soviet 
influence would render a return to status quo entirely impossible.
15
 For the left, resistance against 
Nazi occupation was an expression of anti-Fascism and thus a successful conclusion of the 
struggle that from the point of view of the European left began in Spain in 1936. For the French 
left the beginning of the battle falls on February 6, 1934 when riots orchestrated by members of 
far-right anti-parliamentary ligues brought about the resignation of the Édouard Daladier 
government. The rioters were labeled “fascist” by their contemporaries and the event stimulated 
the establishment of anti-fascist political organizations; whether the ligues, specifically the Croix 
de Feu, were indeed fascist remains a topic of debate.
16
 This mutually reinforcing nature of anti-
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fascism and résistancialisme is further evident in Judt’s account of the Marxist flirtations of 
France’s intellectual community in the two decades after liberation. Revolution, so closely 
associated with political Marxism, was, albeit in a more abstract form, framed by Sartre as 
unconditionally obligatory. According to Judt, to the intellectuals of the 1940s and 50s, the 
concept of resistance was closely associated with revolution because resistance is at the most 
basic level “the condition of being anti-something.”17 Fascism became the target of this condition 
among French Marxist and Marxist-sympathizing intellectuals. This, however, was not on the 
grounds of Marxist theory as echoed in the definition of fascism outlined by the Communist 
International, but because of the thinkers’ recent experience of war and occupation: 
[World War II] taught them something of the shocking specificity of fascism; more 
violent, more extreme, more total in its convictions than anything they had previously 
encountered, it was the true and ultimate force of evil. To the struggle against fascism, all 
else must be subsumed.
18
 
 
The conceptualization of resistance as a notion analogous to revolution allows one to 
frame résistancialisme within the broad context of French political culture. Kedward relates that 
1942 saw the publication of a newspaper using the title of Le Père Duchesne, thus deliberately 
drawing a connection to a radical paper first printed in 1793 then imitated during both 19
th
 
century revolutions and the Paris Commune. Résistants, he continues, “were partly a rebirth of 
the patriotic ‘gun-behind-the-door’ mentality of barricades and revolt.”19 In his Divided Memory, 
Olivier Wieviorka chronicles the continued influence of memories of the Second World War on 
French politics and society. Despite the efforts of historians in the 1980s to argue otherwise, 
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France’s role in the war viewed in strictly military terms cannot provide a narrative of heroism as 
battlefield casualties, a supposed measure of fearless patriotism, of the May-June campaign were 
not close to surpassing those of the fall campaign of 1914. Additionally, Wieviorka argues, 
allowing the crystallization of national memory to run its course unimpeded would have entailed 
that, at best, the French would assume the identity of powerless victims, at worst, that of the 
enemy’s active accomplices. The inability to extract narratives of military valor and the 
ambiguity of occupied France’s role in the war led the successive governments of France (and of 
the Benelux countries) to embrace narratives of heroic resistance.
20
  
The period in French history that saw the emergence of Poujade and Poujadism was 
actually a low water mark when it comes to the volume and intensity of résistancialist rhetoric 
emerging from the upper levels of government.
21
 Between the election of 1951 and the collapse 
of the Fourth Republic in 1958, official state commemorations focused not on the Second World 
War but rather on the First (to the extent that Pétain and the collaboration he personified could be 
avoided).
22
 Accusations of fascism following the election of 1956, however, did not originate 
among the governing parties of the center-left; their source was rather among the two opposing 
political blocs that shared not only their exclusion from cabinets, but also their résistancialist 
source of legitimacy: the Gaullist right represented after 1954 by the National Center of Social 
Republicans (Centre national des républicains sociaux—RS) and the Communists. 
The PCF daily L’Humanité, which had for months ratcheted up its anti-Poujadist rhetoric, 
compared the electoral popularity of the UFF to that of the Croix de Feu and its offshoot Parti 
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Social Français in the 1930s. Similarity in circumstances called for similar solutions as the article 
proceeded to argue for the creation of a Popular Front government because the “swamp” that was 
the victorious Republican Front could not, without the help of the Communists, halt the rise of 
fascism.
23
 In an article written by an author seeking to remain anonymous, Le Figaro proposed a 
rather far-reaching conspiracy theory that “L’Humanité refused to publish. Because prominent 
members of the Communist Party like Jacques Duclos were sent to infiltrate the structures of the 
UDCA in its early days, the PCF was in fact pulling the strings all along. It was according to the 
cunning plan of the Communists that the Poujadists began to display their anti-parliamentary 
traits. Because Poujade could be labeled a fascist threat to the Republic, the centrist coalition 
would be forced to turn to the far Left and its anti-fascist experience to combat this danger, thus 
allowing the PCF to hold a prominent government role for the first time in a decade.
24
 Far-
fetched though this proposition may be, its existence suggests that the press of the moderate 
right, and in turn the public, would have been keenly aware of the Communists’ tendency to turn 
to their anti-fascist history as a source of political legitimacy.  
The Communists’ commitment to anti-fascism was further evident during the first half of 
February as the invalidation of newly-elected Poujadist deputies was debated. Invalidation was 
first proposed on January 25 on the grounds that the three parties grouped together in the 
parliamentary group of Union et fraternité française (UDCA, Union de défense des 
agriculteurs—UDAF, and Action civique—AC) were not properly registered under the terms of 
1951’s loi des apparentements. The law allowed parties to unite as coalitions at the level of 
electoral constituencies. If a coalition secured over fifty percent of the constituency vote, it 
would receive all the National Assembly seats on the line. Historians are in agreement that the 
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law was intended as a means for the centrist Third Force coalition to lessen the influence of the 
Communist and Gaullist extremes of the 1950s.
25
 Apparentements explain why in 1951 the 
PCF’s victory in the popular vote did not correspond to a plurality of seats in the National 
Assembly. In the months preceding the election of 1956, electoral reform proposals encompassed 
a potential re-imposition of two round voting which would have further marginalized the 
extremes in addition to suggestions of abolishing the apparentements system; both reforms failed 
to attract sufficient support, the latter notably attracting overwhelming Communist support.
26
 
The Communists’—arguably justified—history of opposition to the Fourth Republic’s 
electoral system becomes quite noteworthy when one examines the debates that surrounded the 
invalidation of Poujadists on the basis of apparentements when it was the PCF that most 
vociferously supported their application. Eleven UFF deputies faced invalidation when the 
National Assembly met on February 16. After a heated debate that saw Jean-Marie Le Pen and 
Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, two future right wing presidential candidates, call for the 
resignation of André Le Troquer, president of the National Assembly, over his support for the 
unconstitutional invalidation, the Communist-drafted proposal was put to a vote. Before the 
procedure could commence, however, Jean Damasio, a Poujadist deputy from Paris sprinted atop 
the podium, to shout “on ne votera pas!” After a Communist speaker attempted unsuccessfully to 
forcibly remove Damasio, benches at opposing extremes of the hemicycle emptied onto the tiled 
floor that surrounds the speakers’ platform and a brawl commenced.27 A cartoon on the front 
page of the following day’s Le Figaro depicts Le Troquer addressing rows of bedridden deputies 
captioned “[f]or: 326 fractures; against: 315 miscellaneous injuries; the motion of invalidation is 
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adopted.”28 The cartoon does not address the paradoxical fact that members of the Communist 
party were willing to use physical force (and in a few cases get arrested) to defend the 
enforcement of a law passed specifically to lessen their political influence.  
The following day the debate resumed and the anti-fascist motivations of the Communists 
became evident yet again.  In their biography of Jean-Marie Le Pen, Gilles Bresson and Christian 
Lionet recount a scene in which the young Poujadist was accused of being a fascist and an agent 
of the Gestapo, to which he responded by reminding his accusers that his father had been killed 
by the Nazi police before accusing the Communists of fascism - both sides demonstrating the 
tendency to use the term rather arbitrarily.
29
 The invalidation of Poujadist deputies did indeed 
succeed while its consequences further reinforce the notion that Communist support for the 
measure was motivated by anti-fascist dogma rather than by political pragmatism as the vacated 
seats wound up being given to Socialists and Radicals.  
Le Pen, who would hold the title of youngest modern member of the National Assembly 
until his granddaughter’s electoral success in 2012, functioned as Poujade’s parliamentary 
spokesman and closest confidant. On March 5, 1956 he and eight other UDCA members headed 
to Toulouse to attend a rally in an industrial area of the city. Missing service at Dien Bien Phu by 
mere months, Le Pen and his fellow Poujadists found themselves besieged soon after arriving in 
the southwestern town. A Communist counter-demonstration transformed into a 5,000-strong 
mob armed with bottles and construction tools. The former paratrooper and his fellow deputies 
broke off chair legs, fashioning clubs to match crowbars, and batted their way out. With the 
intruders gone, the mayor of Toulouse, Raymond Badiou, led the crowd in the Internationale and 
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the Marseillaise before re-interpreting the words of Philippe Pétain at Verdun in proclaiming that 
“in Toulouse, as in all France, Fascism will not pass.”30  
Marginalized in the parliament since 1947, the French Communist Party’s policy in the 
1950s aimed at regaining the support of the French electorate lost in part due to an emergent 
Cold War mentality and because of its continued espousal of Stalinism which became less and 
less palatable. Describing the Poujadists as fascist allowed the PCF to forcefully associate them 
with the wartime occupier and with an ideology against which French communists had fought for 
two decades, thus invoking the image of the party as defenders of the Republic and not the allies 
of a foreign power. By forcefully combatting the supposed fascist threat posed by the deputies 
sitting opposite them, the Communists sought to conjure up images of the wartime struggle 
which legitimized their role in the government during the period of Tripartisme (1944-47). Not 
characterized by the same physical violence as the Communist struggle against the Poujadists, 
opposition from the Gaullist right did exist, though it has not been noted by scholars of the 
period.  
Son of a World War I era radical-socialist, Michel Maurice-Bokanowski was elected into 
the National Assembly in 1951 as one of the 121 members of de Gaulle’s Rassemblement du 
peuple français (RPF), after the party’s breakup he joined the Républicains sociaux on whose 
ticket he was reelected in 1956. As the several-week-long invalidation debate was commencing, 
Bokanowski voiced his strong opinion against the proposition though not because he deemed it 
illegitimate or because he supported the policies of the UFF. “Invalidation,” he argued, “would 
inevitably give rise to martyrs.”31 “For the first time in the Republic’s history,” he continued, 
“fifty-three fascists occupied seats in the Chamber of Deputies;” Bokanowski then informed the 
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media of his intentions to establish a Committee for the Defense of the Republic.
32
 The defense, 
however, was not to be put up against Poujade himself but rather against the “hidden forces” that 
controlled the UDCA leader and would one day ask that he take action and seize power. 
Justifying the existence of defense committees, Bokanowski explained that, 
If in Germany and Italy apolitical defense committees had responded to fascist tactics in 
kind, if they had opposed violence with equal violence or responded with tenfold reprisal, 
if fascist boycotts had been countered with boycotts of fascist businesses, the threat 
would have been stopped in its tracks.
33
 
As had been the Communists, members of the Gaullist right were kept out of government since 
1947 despite always controlling over a quarter of the vote. In fighting against what they dubbed 
fascism, these marginalized deputies would have likewise sought to conjure up images of the 
Resistance. However, while the Communist myth of the Resistance focused specifically on 
continued combat and their anti-fascist pedigree, the Gaullist myth was focused on national 
unity. 
One of the main features of de Gaulle’s conception of postwar reconciliation was his 
framing of the profoundly ideological struggle of the Second World War as a much simpler 
interstate conflict and the culmination of the “Thirty Years’ War.” Describing the period between 
1914 and 1945 as a single long war against Germany had a multifold effect. First, it allowed the 
debacle of 1940 to be glossed over as a lost battle in a much larger war. Second, it likened the 
liberation of 1944 to the victory of 1918, meaning that all the ambiguity of a war where a notable 
part of the French population collaborated with the enemy was equated with a more clear-cut 
battlefield victory.
34
 Finally, the Thirty Years’ War narrative reduced the complexity of World 
War II and hid the political divisions that characterized interwar France as the country was 
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instead portrayed as persistently united against a common foreign enemy.
35
 Rousso’s guerre 
fracnco-française could thus be obscured behind a façade of an international war. Because of the 
premises of the Thirty Years’ War narrative, homegrown fascism ascribed to the Poujadists 
became a foreign entity in a struggle against which the Gaullists could have seen an opportunity 
for promoting national unity.  
To understand how such a seemingly paradoxical assertion makes sense, a final brief 
departure is in order. Published in 1954 and republished several times since, René Rémond’s Les 
Droites en France (originally La Droite en France de 1815 à nos jours) is considered one of the 
most important works concerning French political theory and culture. In his profoundly 
controversial analysis of fascism, Rémond argues that, because a mature fascist party never 
emerged in France, the country was inherently immune to fascism as it constituted a foreign 
ideology that the French right could not accommodate.
36
 In addition to being the source of the 
immunity thesis, Les Droites en France is the origin of the codified separation of France’s 
traditional right into three distinct currents: Orleanism, Bonapartism, and Legitimism. Orleanism, 
corresponds to liberal conservatism, Bonapartism, a term also used in the writings of Karl Marx, 
refers to statist populism (like that of de Gaulle); finally, Legitimism corresponds to reactionism 
or political traditionalism.
37
 Poujade, though generally associated with the parliamentary right, 
cannot intuitively be classified in either of these categories. Gaullist claims of Poujade’s fascism 
function in a way very similar to the immunity thesis. Because “all of France” had been united in 
the Resistance, within the Gaullist ideology of the Thirty Years’ War fascism was conflated with 
belonging to the German nation or at least with foreignness.  Accusing the UFF deputies of 
                                                          
35
 Rousso, Vichy Syndrome, pp. 17-8 
36
 René Rémond, Les Droites en France, (Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1982), pp. 231-8; for criticism of 
Rémond, see among others, Michel Dobry, “French Society’s Allergy to the ‘Fascist Revolution,’” in ed. Brian 
Jenkins, France in the Era of Fascism, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), pp. 133-47 
37
 Ibid. pp 73-120 
- 81 - 
 
fascism, therefore, provided the right with an enemy that resembled the wartime adversary in a 
struggle against whom the Nation had once been united. Much like the second Popular Front that 
the Communists purportedly tried create by uniting against alleged parliamentary fascists, 
Bokanowski’s Committee for the Defense of the Republic aimed to attract members from across 
the political spectrum in a struggle “against renascent fascism.”38  
Portraying Poujade and his followers as fascists, either domestic inheritors of the Vichy 
regime and the Nazi occupiers or adherents to an entirely foreign ideology, allowed the PCF and 
the fragmented Gaullist right to not only harness the power of their respective visions of the 
Resistance Myth but perhaps to tap into a larger ideas pervasive in the French mentality. 
Portraying themselves as defenders of the Palais Bourbon or of the Republic, opponents of 
Poujade would have tapped into a glorification of defense described by Roland Barthes in his 
1957 work, Mythologies. Describing press portrayals of the Paris floods of 1955 Barthes notes a 
quality similar to the “myth of 1848.” By avoiding images of basements being pumped and 
focusing instead on the “nobler” barricades constructed by Parisians, the press (predominantly 
Paris Match and Le Figaro) provided imagery highly evocative of the city’s history of urban 
resistance. A focus on defensive imagery allowed what was seemingly a catastrophe to be 
portrayed and consumed as more of a celebration.
39
 Not only did the Myth of Resistance 
accomplish political goals in the postwar period, it was perhaps a mainstay in conceptions of 
what it meant to be French. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Poujadist crusade that began when a Lot stationer usurped control of an ongoing wave of 
anti-fiscal outbursts flew largely under the national radar for two and a half years until its 
representatives, seemingly out of nowhere, arrived in Paris to kick down the doors of the Palais 
Bourbon. Once inside, however, the 51 deputies largely sat quietly as political instability, which 
was in part a root cause of the popular dissatisfaction that helped elect them, persisted around 
them. Fostered by the lack of national exposure to the movement’s growth, some well-founded 
criticism of the movement’s structure and creed emerged. Because of its ideological vagueness 
that at times ranged into professed opposition to everything, the political Poujadism that emerged 
in 1955 was an empty vessel that meaning could be poured into according to one’s political 
motivations. A common theme that emerges in criticisms of the Poujadists voiced before and 
after their electoral success is that of fascism; a distinction, however, should be drawn between 
accusations of fascism founded in assessments of the movement’s unseemly ideological 
components or its allegedly authoritarian tactics. Both categories are useful in discerning 
elements of 1950s French political culture as well as determining how interpretations of fascism 
would have been constructed in the immediate postwar period, a time characterized by such 
pervasive moral condemnation of fascism that its academic studies were virtually nonexistent. 
 In 1956 the two loudest parliamentary critics of Poujade and his movement were both at a 
crossroads. The Communist Party, so vehement in its criticism of the Poujadists, would soon 
experience its most profound internal crisis as its support of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 
late October and early November would effectively discredit it in the eyes of all but the most 
staunchly pro-Soviet voters. The decline of the PCF was so thorough that it would take until 
1978 for the party to secure even half the number of seats in the National Assembly that they 
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controlled in 1956. The Gaullists, meanwhile, once again led by the General, would, following 
the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958, be the single largest force in the French legislature 
for over two decades. Though the popularity of the Gaullist right and of the Communists was to 
soon take opposite trajectories, in 1956 the two parties exhibited two fundamental similarities. 
First, because the two political extremes shared a level of deep-seated opposition to the Fourth 
Republic’s political institutions, they had both been excluded from the formation of governments 
since the beginning of the decade. Second, the Gaullist right and the PCF shared a history of 
anti-fascism and founded their postwar aspirations to govern on their membership in the 
Resistance.  
 My aim was not to portray Poujade as the first person ever to be called a fascist with the 
term functioning as a term of abuse or insult not reflective of its addressee’s political stances, it 
was rather to provide a case study for this phenomenon. In a famous 1944 article, George Orwell 
noted that,  
as used, the word ‘Fascism’ is almost entirely meaningless. In conversation, of course, it 
is used even more wildly than in print. I have heard it applied to farmers, shopkeepers, 
Social Credit, corporal punishment, fox-hunting, bull-fighting, the 1922 Committee, the 
1941 Committee, Kipling, Gandhi, Chiang Kai-Shek, homosexuality, Priestley's 
broadcasts, Youth Hostels, astrology, women, dogs and I do not know what else.
40
 
In a way, the case of fascism-as-an-insult being directed at Poujade is an exceptional one as it 
relies not just on the morally repulsive connotations of fascism and Nazism, but is rather an 
expression of underlying lineages of political parties and of their deliberate politicization of 
memory and history. If anti-fascist rhetoric directed against the Poujadists is viewed as an 
expression of the Resistance Myth, the parliamentary arguments and fisticuffs that followed the 
election of 1956 are a valuable glimpse of the résistancialisme during a period when, as 
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historians have demonstrated, invocations of the Resistance were at an all-time low before they 
would reach an apogee during de Gaulle’s presidency. Furthermore, although this was not a 
study meant to compare accusations of fascism across national borders during the postwar 
period, if the charges against Poujade are viewed as attempts at establishing political legitimacy 
by locating parties or movements within a continuity of pre-World War II and wartime anti-
fascism, the case of Pierre Poujade might provide some insight into such propaganda concoctions 
as Berlin’s Antifaschistischer Schutzwall, known to most as the Berlin Wall. 
While the UDCA continued its operation, the UFF disintegrated; in 1958 its reelected 
parliamentary representatives would have come either from de Gaulle’s Union for the New 
Republic or the National Center of Independents and Peasants. While de Gaulle’s populism 
would have appealed to the more poujadist UFF affiliates, the CNI attracted the more radically 
right-wing members of the movement (including Jean-Marie Le Pen). The relationship between 
Poujade and Le Pen provides a glimpse into the causes for the decline of Le Mouvement 
Poujade. Pierre Poujade never ran for elected office at the national level, Le Pen, on the other 
hand, has been a prominent feature of French presidential elections since the mid-1970s. In 2002, 
as Le Pen prepared to face off against Jacques Chirac in the second round of the presidential 
election, London’s The Guardian interviewed “the man who launched Le Pen on to France's 
national political scene,” at the time 81. Poujade promptly declared that his backing of the Front 
National leader in the heyday of Poujadism was “the worst thing I did in my life. It would have 
been better if I’d broken my leg.” Poujade then chastised Le Pen for “living in his chateau at 
Saint-Cloud, spending the millions he got by heaven knows what means and [not representing 
the interests of or] caring about the little man.”41 While the early UDCA could accommodate 
members of Rémond’s legitimist right such as Le Pen, deep fissures emerged as political 
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Poujadism began to crystalize around the time of the outbreak of the Algerian War. Being a self-
described man of the people, Poujade sought to cater to the desires of everybody in his 
movement, thus leading to the adoption of the movement’s seeming opposition to everything 
summarized in the slogan on the podium in Victor Weisz’s “Poujadolf” cartoon as well as its 
commitment to the Estates-General project in all its nebulousness. Poujade’s unrelenting 
populism led to the movement’s spectacular rise and it was his populism that led to its slide into 
obscurity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 86 - 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
PRIMARY SOURCES: 
“Brive-la-Gaillarde,” http://cassini.ehess.fr  
 
“Constitution de 1946, IVe République,” conseil-constitutionnel.fr 
 
Le Figaro (microfilm). 
 
“Foreign News: An Ordinary Frenchman,” Time, Monday, Mar. 19, 1956: 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,824029,00.html 
 
“Hymne de Marche de l’U.D.C.A,” infos28Paris, http://www.idhm.eu/infos28 
 
Le Monde (online archive, lemonade.fr). 
 
Orwell, George. “What is Fascism?,” Tribune, 1944. 
 
Poujade, Pierre. A l’heure de la colère. Paris : Albin Michel, 1977. 
 
---. J’ai choisi le combat, Saint-Céré: Société Générale des Editions et des Publications,  
1955. 
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. “Republic of Silence” trans. A.J. Liebling, New York: Harcourt, Brace  
& Co., 1947. 
 
“Saint-Céré,” http://cassini.ehess.fr 
 
“Speech of De Gaulle ‘Martyred Paris, but liberated Paris’ (1944),” YouTube video,   
0:43, posted by Archives at Risk, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=makDyycHvmw&feature=fvhl. 
 
“Un peu d'histoire,”  http://www.saint-cere.fr 
 
Webster, Paul. “Le Pen's ex- mentor regrets rise of 'liar.'” The Guardian, April 27, 2002. 
 
Zaretsky, Robert. “The Tea Party Last Time,” The New York Times, February 2, 2010. 
 
- 87 - 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES: 
 ARTICLES: 
Allardyce, Gilbert. “What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept,” The   
American Historical Review, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Apr., 1979), 367-88 
 
Burrin, Philippe. “Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept,” History and Memory, Vol. 9,  
No. 1/2, (Fall 1997), 321-349. 
 
Caplan, Jane. “Theories of Fascism: Nicos Poulantzas as Historian Nicos Poulantzas,” History  
Workshop No. 3 (Spring, 1977), 83-100. 
 
Dobry, Michel. “French Society’s Allergy to the ‘Fascist Revolution.’” in ed. Brian Jenkins,  
France in the Era of Fascism, New York: Berghahn Books, 2005. 
 
Fitzgerald, Sean. “The Anti-Modern Rhetoric of Le Mouvement Poujade,” The Review of  
Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr., 1970), 167-190. 
 
Eatwell, Roger. “On Defining the 'Fascist Minimum’: the Centrality of Ideology,” Journal of  
Political Ideologies,  Vol. 1 Issue 3, (October, 1996), 303-20.  
 
---. “Poujadism and Neo-Poujadism: From Revolt to Reconciliation,” ed. Philip Cerney, Social  
Movements and Protest in France, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982. 
 
Gentile, Emilio. “Fascism as Political Religion,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 25, No.  
2/3 (May - Jun., 1990), 229-251. 
 
Grabowski, Waldemar. “Konspiracja Polska we Francji,” Zeszyty Historyczne. 2009, Iss. 170,  
pp. 89-119. 
 
Griffin, Roger. “Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age. From New Consensus to New Wave?,”  
Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2012), 1-17 
 
Irvine, William. “Fascism in France and the Strange Case of the Croix de Feu,” The Journal of  
Modern History Vol. 63, No. 2, A Special Issue on Modern France (Jun., 1991), 271-95. 
 
Payne, Stanley. “On the Heuristic Value of the Concept of Political Religion and its  
Application,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions Volume 6, Issue 2, 
(September 2005), 163-74. 
 
Roberts, David. “'Political Religion' and the Totalitarian Departures of Inter-War Europe: On the  
Uses and Disadvantages of an Analytical Category,” Contemporary European History, 
Vol. 18, No. 4 (Nov., 2009), 381-414. 
 
Rose, Arnold. “Anti-Americanism in France,” The Antioch Review, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter,  
1952), 466-85 
- 88 - 
 
 
 
 
Shields, James. “An Enigma Still, Poujadism Fifty Years On,” French Politics, Culture &  
Society, Vol. 22, No. 1, (Spring 2004), 40-62. 
 
---. “The Poujadist Movement: a Faux ‘Fascism,” Modern & Contemporary France, Vol. 8, Is. 1  
(2000), 19-35. 
 
BOOKS: 
 
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: The World Publishing Company,  
1958. 
 
Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. New York: Hill and Wang, 2011. 
 
Borne, Dominique. Petits Bourgeois en Révolte?: Le Mouvement Poujade. Paris : Flammarion,  
1977. 
 
Burleigh, Michael. Moral Combat: Good and Evil in World War II.  New York: Harper  
Perennial, 2011. 
 
--- and Wippermann, Wolfgang. The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945, New York: Cambridge  
University Press: New York, 1993. 
 
Davies, Peter, The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present: from Maistre to Le Pen, New  
York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
--- and Lynch, Derek. The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right. New York:  
Routledge, 2002. 
 
Gaffney, John and Holmes, Diana. Stardom in Postwar France. New York, Bergham Books,  
2007. 
 
Gildea, Robert. France Since 1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Griffin, Roger ed. International Fascism: Theories, Causes, and the New Consensus, New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 
---. The Nature of Fascism. New York: Routledge, 1993. 
 
Goguel, François. Géographie des élections françaises, Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1952. 
 
Hoffmann, Stanley. Le Mouvement Poujade, Paris : Armand Colin, 1956. 
 
Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace, New York: Penguin Books, 1977. 
- 89 - 
 
 
Jenkins, Brian, ed. France in the Era of Fascism, New York: Berghahn Books, 2005. 
 
Judt, Tony. Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956. New York: New York  
University Press, 1993. 
 
Kedward, Rod. La Vie en Bleu: France and the French since 1900. New York: Allen Lane,  
2005. 
 
Passmore, Kevin. Fascism: a Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press,  
2002. 
 
Paxton, Robert. Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order. New York: Columbia University  
Press, 1982. 
 
Payne, Stanley. Fascism: Comparison and Definition. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,  
1980. 
 
Rémond, René. Les Droites en France, Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1982. 
 
Rieux, Jean-Pierre. The Fourth Republic: 1944-1958, New York: Cambridge University Press,  
1987. 
 
Rousso, Henry. The Vichy Syndrome, trans. Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge: Harvard  
University Press, 1990. 
 
 
Suleiman, Susan. Crises of Memory and the Second World War, Cambridge: Harvard University  
Press, 2006. 
 
Wieviorka, Olivier. Divided Memory: French Recollections of World War II from the Liberation  
to the Present, trans. George Holoch, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010. 
 
Winock, Michel. Nationalisme, antisémitisme, et fascisme en France. Paris: Seuil, 1982. 
 
